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MURR AND WISCONSIN: THE BADGER
67$7(¶67$.(215(*8LATORY TAKINGS
Property rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property ownership
empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where
governments are always eager to do so for them.
— Justice Anthony Kennedy1
Ronald Reagan said, ‘Freedom is never more than one generation away from
extinction . . . . It must be fought for, protected, and handed on [to our children]
to do the same . . . .’ So it is with property rights. They must always be fought
for, through good times and bad. Even with victory, defenders of this core
liberty can never rest.
— John M. Groen2
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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 27, 2017, the Wisconsin Legislature significantly weakened
state and local regulations along the pristine St. Croix River.3 While Wisconsin
has prioritized deregulation over the past decade,4 there was something
PDUNHGO\ GLIIHUHQW DERXW WKLV VSHFLILF DFWLRQ  7KH :LVFRQVLQ +RPHRZQHUV¶
Bill of Rights, formally titled Act 67,5 was a swift legislative response to Murr
v. Wisconsin.6 In Murr, the United States Supreme Court upheld pervasive
governmental UHJXODWLRQVUHVWULFWLQJWKH0XUUIDPLO\¶VULJKWVto freely use or
dispose of its waterside property along the St. Croix River.7 The Wisconsin
HomeownerV¶ Bill of Rights restored these property rights by pulling back on

3. See H. Sterling Burnett, Wisconsin Legislature Passes “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights”, THE
HEARTLAND INST. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/wisconsinlegislature-passes-homeowners-bill-of-rights [https://perma.cc/SE9H-8HWL].
4. See, e.g., Mary Spicuzza, Telecom Deregulation Bill gets State Legislature’s OK, WIS. STATE
JOURNAL (May 12, 2011), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/telecomderegulation-bill-gets-state-legislature-s-ok/article_f4ceb314-7bf8-11e0-8887-001cc4c03286.html
[https://perma.cc/4FC5-UBB6]; Steven Verburg, Wisconsin Republicans Launch New Rollback of Air,
Water
Protections,
WIS.
STATE
JOURNAL
(Oct.
3,
2017),
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/wisconsin-republicans-launch-newrollback-of-air-water-protections/article_81101a90-56a2-5841-aa7a-aef12037c77c.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5V7-BYQB]; Laurel White, Wisconsin Assembly Approves Deregulation of RentTo-Own- Companies, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-assemblyapproves-deregulation-rent-own-companies [https://perma.cc/QHQ7-YSMV].
5. 2017 Wis. Act 67.
6. 137 S. Ct. 1933.
7. Id. at 1950.
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key statewide land use regulations, bringing substantial FKDQJHWR:LVFRQVLQ¶V
regulatory framework related to land use.8
From a broader jurisprudential perspective, Murr is simply another in a long
line of cases that fails to clarify the regulatory takings doctrine.9 Indeed, the
majority in Murr doubles down on an already incoherent doctrine, doubtless
thrusting lower courts around the nation into further confusion on the issue.10
Nonetheless, state governments can minimize the damage of this complex,
factor-ULGGHQ GHFLVLRQ VWDWH OHJLVODWXUHV E\ IROORZLQJ :LVFRQVLQ¶V OHDG DQG
actively working to preserve individual property rights, and state courts by
either (1) independently analyzing the Takings Clause pursuant to parallel
provisions of their own state constitutions or (2) narrowly construing Murr¶V
multi-factor test.11
This comment examines the current state of the regulatory takings doctrine
at both the federal and staWHOHYHODQDO\]HVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQ
Murr v. Wisconsin, and discusses the need to set up structural protections to
preserve the rights of private property owners. Specifically, Part II discusses
the fascinating origins and background of the Takings Clause and the regulatory
takings doctrine. Part III examines the regulatory takings doctrine as it was
structured when the Supreme Court decided Murr. Part IV provides
background analysis of the regulatory framework and Wisconsin regulatory
takings law that undergirds Murr. Part V describes the Murr¶V factual
EDFNJURXQG GLVFXVVHV WKH SDUWLHV¶ DUJXPHQWV DQG DQDO\]HV WKH 6XSUHPH
&RXUW¶V RSLQLRQ  3DUW 9, DQDO\]HV WKH JHQHUDO UHDFWLRQ WR WKLV ODQGPDUN
decision, evaluates :LVFRQVLQ¶V +RPHRZQHUV¶ %ill of Rights, and provides
direction for Wisconsin courts in their handling of the post-Murr regulatory
takings doctrine. Part VII concludes with a brief overview and presents two
important takeaways from Murr.

8. 2017 Wis. Act 67; see also ANNA HENNING & SCOTT GROSZ, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL
ACT
MEMO:
2017
WISCONSIN
ACT
67
1±4
(Dec.
1,
2017),
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/lcactmemo/act067 [https://perma.cc/5TR7-XPWA].
This legislation has garnered harsh criticism from some. See, e.g., Greg Seitz, Wisconsin Legislature
Weakens St. Croix River Scenic Protections, ST. CROIX 360 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.stcroix360.com/2017/11/wisconsin-legislature-weakens-st-croix-river-scenicprotections/ [https://perma.cc/3B6P-ZC8A]; Greg Seitz, 50th Anniversary: December Dates Mark
Milestones in St. Croix River Conservation, ST. CROIX 360 (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.stcroix360.com/2017/11/50th-anniversary-december-dates-mark-milestones-in-st-croixriver-conservation/ [https://perma.cc/4KHD-XSC7].
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Section VI.A.
11. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.
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II. TAKINGS CLAUSE SUMMARY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS
A. Early English Roots and Pre-Takings Clause Colonial Practice
The origins of the Takings Clause can be traced to Article 39 of Magna
Carta,12 ZKLFKVWDWHVWKDW³>Q@RIUHHPDQVKDOOEH . . stripped of his rights or
possessions . . . except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the
Article 39 created procedural limitations ³DJDLQVW DUELWUDU\
ODQG´13
infringements of personal liberty and rights of property.´14 But these
protections were limited to the physical appropriation of property and failed to
place any limitations on governmental regulation of private property.15 Indeed,
governmental land use regulations ³GHVLJQHG WR SURPRWH WKH SXEOLF EHQHILW´
were left unrestricted.16 Additionally, there was generally no compensation
requirement even for the physical appropriation of property; Article 39 and
subsequent common-law protections only provided property owners the right
to due process.17
Around the time of the founding of the American colonies, the works of Sir
Edward Coke helped revitalize an emphasis on personal rights, liberties, and

12. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 56 (1973).
13. MAGNA CARTA ART. 39, https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-englishtranslation [https://perma.cc/B2J4-8KN3]. Magna Carta is a great place to start this analysis of the
7DNLQJV&ODXVHEHFDXVHLWLV³generally regarded as one of the great common-law documents and as
the foundation of constitutional liberties.´ Magna Carta, BLACK¶S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: VOLUME II 215 (3d ed. 1923) (noting
the importance of this provision considering the fact that arbitrary infringement on property rights was
one of the chief grievances against the King of England at the time); see also BOSSELMAN ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 57.
15. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 60±75. In fact, the government widely utilized
land use regulations such as lot-size minimum requirements and construction guidelines and
limitations. Id. at 62, 66; see also DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 18
(2002).
16. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra QRWH  DW   ³>-@XVWLFH ZDV QRW RIIHQGHG´ ZKHUH WKH
government regulated private land use for a legitimate government purpose. Id.
17. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785±86 (1995). The predominant early colonial legal
structure left the determination of compensation to the political processes; compensation was not a
JHQHUDOO\UHFRJQL]HG³ULJKW´SULRUWRWKH)LIWK$PHQGPHQW¶V7DNLQJV&ODXVHSee id. at 785±86. Yet,
government seizure of private property²limited for many years only to improved or enclosed
property²generally did result in compensation. See id. at 787; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra
note 12, at 85; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 16±18. Additionally, there was a generally
accepted emergency exception for the compensation of developed lands. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra
note 12, at 86.
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due process of law.18 7KURXJK&RNH¶VZRUNs and, more generally, the Common
Law¶VLQIOXHQFHRQWKHFRORQLHV19 the right to due process in relation to personal
property became one of the defining rights in the New World.20 Consequently,
many colonial laws and early drafts of state constitutions demanded
compensation for actual physical appropriations²even where those
appropriations were for the public¶V benefit.21
Despite this focus on personal property rights, WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDXWKRULW\
to regulate land use remained unquestioned.22 Indeed, early governments
extensively regulated land use and ³QR FRORQLDO FKDUWHU RU VWDWH FRQVWLtution
UHFRJQL]HGWKDWUHJXODWLRQVFRXOGJLYHULVHWRDUHTXLUHPHQWRIFRPSHQVDWLRQ´23
:LWKRXW VR PXFK DV WKH ³UHFRJQL>WLRQ@ >WKDW@ UHJXODWLRQV JDYH ULVH WR D
UHTXLUHPHQWRIFRPSHQVDWLRQ´ODQGXVHUHJXODWLRQUHPDLQHGDQDFFHSWHGDQG
ever-present limitation on property rights.24 In sum, property right protections
through this era were limited to procedural defenses²PHUHO\ ³HFKR>LQJ@
$UWLFOHRI0DJQD&DUWD´25

18. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 77.
19. Id. at 80. See generally ROSCOE POUND, HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW
(1939); W. Hamilton Bryson, English Common Law in Virginia, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 249 (1985); Louis
E. Zuckermann, The Common Law of America, 53 AM. L. REV. 577 (1919).
20. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 82.
21. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 785±86. One early H[DPSOH LV WKH  ³)XQGDPHQWDO
&RQVWLWXWLRQVRI&DUROLQD´ZKLFK²although never fully implemented²called for compensation for
seized property. See id.; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 93 (an early Massachusetts
colonial law required compensaWLRQ IRU WKH WDNLQJ RI OLYHVWRFN   0DVVDFKXVHWWV¶s original state
constitution was the first ratified with a compensation clause. See id. at 95; Treanor, supra note 17, at
790±9HUPRQW¶VGUDIWRIits state constitution called for compensation for government takings.
See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 94; Treanor, supra note 17, at 790; THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 374 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
Additionally, the Northwest Ordinance required compensation for the taking of property. See Treanor,
supra note 17, at 791; THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS, supra, at 374. The colonies often still allowed for either uncompensated or non-value-based
compensation where takings were for governmental use. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 787±88.
22. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 785. Even Sir Edward Coke UHFRJQL]HGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
authority to regulate private property to the point of depriving the land of all productive use.
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 80±81.
23. Treanor, supra note 17, at 785, 787±89. Local governments during the colonial and early
statehood period freely regulated business operations and personal and economic decisions related to
personal property. Id. at 787±89.
24. Id. at 785.
25. Id. at 789. Though real or personal property was protected by colonial charters, these
protections were largely procedural rather than substantive in nature. Id. at 786.
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B. The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
The inclusion of property protections in the Bill of Rights is unsurprising
considering the central status of personal property rights in the colonies. The
Takings Clause²the last clause of the Fifth Amendment²VWDWHV ³QRU VKDOO
private property be taken for public use, without just FRPSHQVDWLRQ´26
Considering the text alone, there is no indication that the Takings Clause was
intended to provide protection for anything less than actual direct physical
appropriations.27 However, speculation regarding its origins, intent, and even
why this specific provision ended up in the Constitution, have muddied the
waters and made this provision particularly difficult to parse.28
One difficulty when analyzing the Takings Clause is the lack of founding
era debate surrounding its implementation.29 The Clause was introduced,
amended, and adopted without significant discussion regarding its content.30
One plausible theory as to why there was no debate surrounding the Takings
Clause seems to be that the Founders were quite content with what it appeared
tRSURSRVHWKH³VWDWXVTXR´RIWDNLQJVODZDWWKHWLPH²procedural protection
from, and compensation for, only direct physical appropriations.31 Thus,
though still open to debate, many scholars believe there was no objection to the
creation and adoption of the Takings Clause because it only appeared to
prohibit direct physical appropriations, not the JRYHUQPHQW¶V widely accepted
authority to regulate property rights.32
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. See Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies
Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 256 (2015).
28. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 9, 13±16, 20; David A. Thomas, Finding More
Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
497, 519±20 (2004).
29. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 791; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 11, 25; Matthew P.
Harrington, Regulatory Takings and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2053, 2078 (2004).
30. See generally COGAN, supra note 21, at 361±72.
31. Treanor, supra note 17, at 785.
32. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2053, 2063. Indeed, many attending the Philadelphia
Convention supported governmental regulation of economic and property rights. See id.; see also
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that there is no affirmative evidence supporting this
assertion, but rather just an uncontradicted body of evidence); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at
104; J. Peter Byrne, A Hobbesian Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property Rights Legacy of Justice
Scalia, 41 VT. L. REV. 733, 735 (2017); Treanor, supra note 17, at 785. But see Eric R. Claeys, Takings,
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1553±55 (2003) (arguing that
those in the founding era did intend to protect against regulatory intrusions); Kris W. Kobach, The
Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1212 (1996)
(noting that regulatory takings law was introduced prior to Mahon).
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This position is further supported by the writings of two key figures whose
work undoubtedly influenced the content of the Takings Clause: Sir William
Blackstone33 and James Madison.34 Blackstone²a champion for individual
liberties and property rights²believed that personal property rights were
fundamental, stating, ³[s]o great moreover is the regard of the law for private
property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
JHQHUDO JRRG RI WKH ZKROH FRPPXQLW\´35 But like Sir Edward Coke,
%ODFNVWRQH XQGHUVWRRG WKDW WKLV ³DEsROXWH ULJKW´ ZDV nonetheless subject to
GLPLQXWLRQ ³E\ WKH ODZV RI WKH ODQG´ thereby indicating that governmental
regulation should not be restricted.36 Many Founding Fathers echoed
%ODFNVWRQH¶VYLHZRISURSHUW\ULJKWV37 In particular, James Madison²the man
who seemingly sua sponte introduced the Takings Clause38²believed that the
8QLWHG 6WDWHV VKRXOG ³SULGH>@ LWVHOI LQ PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH LQYLRODELOLW\ RI
property . . . provid[ing] that none shall be taken directly even for public use
ZLWKRXW LQGHPQLILFDWLRQ WR WKH RZQHU´39 The Founders, then, seem to have
largely understood that the Takings Clause reached only direct physical
appropriations and not governmental regulations.ͶͲ
33. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 90±91 (noting that the work of Blackstone
profoundly influenced the Founders as they constructed the Constitution).
34. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 784.
35. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134±35, 140±41 (1st
ed. 1765). Blackstone did note, however, that such action could be justified where the owner is given
³IXOOLQGHPQLILFDWLRQ´IRUWKHSURSHUW\Id.
36. Id. at 134 (³7KHWKLUGDEsolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which
consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land´) (emphasis added).
37. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787: VOLUME I (Max Farrand ed.,
1937 0DGLVRQVWDWHG³7KHSULPDU\REMHFWVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DUHWKHVHFXULW\RISURSHUW\DQGSXEOLF
VDIHW\´Id. DW+DPLOWRQVWDWHG³2QHJUHDWREM>HFWLYH@RI>J@RY>HUQPHQW@LVSHUVRQDOSURWHFWLRQ
DQGWKHVHFXULW\RI>S@URSHUW\´Id. at 302. Morris stated, ³0HQGRQ¶WXQLWHIRUOLEHUW\RU/LIHWKH\
SRVVHVVERWKLQWKHVDYDJHVWDWHLQWKHKLJKHVWSHUIHFWLRQWKH\XQLWHIRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRISURSHUW\´Id.
at 536 (emphasis omitted). Early Supreme Court precedent further supports these views. VanhorQH¶V
/HVVHHY'RUUDQFH86   VWDWLQJWKDW³[t]he Constitution expressly declares, that the
right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property is natural, LQKHUHQWDQGXQDOLHQDEOH´ 
38. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 10, 13; Treanor, supra note 17, at 834.
MADISON,
PROPERTY
(Mar.
29,
1792),
http://press39. JAMES
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.html [https://perma.cc/LJ5D-B6Z7]. (emphasis
added); see also Treanor, supra note 17, at 838 (³Property was one of the series of essays that Madison
published in the National Gazette QHZVSDSHULQUHVSRQVHWR+DPLOWRQ¶VHFRQRPLFSURJUDP . . . ´ 
40. But this view was not unanimously held. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787: VOLUME II (Max Farrand ed., 1937). For example, John F. Mercer criticized
WKLVDEVROXWHSRVLWLRQVWDWLQJWKDW³>L@WLVDILUVWSULQFLSOHLQSROLWLFDOVFLHQFHWKDWZKHQHYHUWKHULJKWV
RISURSHUW\DUHVHFXUHGDQDULVWRFUDF\ZLOOJURZRXWRILW´Id. at 284. For a thorough analysis of the
original understanding of the Takings Clause, see generally Treanor, supra note 17.

268

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[102:261

The work of St. George Tucker, a historian and contemporary of the
&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VDGRSWLRQalso indicates that the Takings Clause was meant to be
limited in application to physical appropriations:
That part of the [Fifth Amendment] which declares that private
property shall not be taken for public use, without just
compensation, was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary
and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and
other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently
practi[c]ed during the revolutionary war, without any
compensation whatever.41
7KXVLQ7XFNHU¶Vview, the Takings Clause only mandated compensation for
physical seizure of property, an issue that was common throughout the
Revolutionary War.42
Viewed together, the limited text of the Takings Clause, the lack of
recorded debate on the issue, and the then-predominant view of governmental
regulations suggests that the Founders intended the Takings Clause to merely
provide procedural protections, requiring compensation only for the
JRYHUQPHQW¶VGLUHFWSK\VLFDODSSURSULDWLRQRISULYDWHSURSHUW\43
C. Early Judicial Interpretation and the Incorporation of the Takings
Clause
Through the dawn of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court had little
opportunity to develop its own Takings Clause analysis due to the limited
power of the federal government and the fact that the Fifth Amendment was not
41. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, NOTES OF REFERENCE 305±06 (electronic ed. 2003) (emphasis
added).
42. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 791±92; see also Harrington, supra note 29, at 2073±74
(noting the prevalence of such involuntary impressment of property throughout the revolutionary war);
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 11±12. But see Thomas, supra note 28, at 545.
43. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2078 (noting that Madison only intended to deal with direct
and not regulatory takings issues); see also Treanor, supra note 17, at 838±39. SLQFH WKH &RXUW¶V
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), LW LV FOHDU WKDW ³>K@LVWRULFDO
DUJXPHQWV KDYH SOD\HG YLUWXDOO\ QR UROH LQ WKH DFWXDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH FODXVH´ RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29 (1985); see also
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1057±   %ODFNPXQ-GLVVHQWLQJ  ³>7@KH)LIWK
$PHQGPHQW¶V 7DNLQJV &ODXVH RULJLQDOO\ GLG QRW extend to regulations of property, whatever the
HIIHFW´ (YHQ-XVWLFH6FDOLDDJUHDWFKDPSLRQRIRULJLQDOLVPDFFHSWHGUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVDVPHUHO\
part of our ³FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFXOWXUH´Id. at 1028. While the Court addressed the original understanding
of the Takings Clause in Lucas, that discussion only showed that the Court has lost its way on the issue
of regulatory takings and the original understanding of the clause no longer has any bearing on modern
regulatory takings law. Id. at 1055±60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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yet applicable to the action of state governments.44 Nonetheless, those early
state and Supreme Court opinions that did analyze the Takings Clause restricted
its scope to the direct physical appropriation of property²seemingly consistent
with the original understanding of the clause.45
In the Legal Tender Cases,46 the Supreme Court discussed the basis for this
OLPLWHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH7DNLQJV&ODXVH³>7KH7DNLQJV&ODXVH@KDValways
been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to the
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never
been supposed to . . . inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to
LQGLYLGXDOV´47 Generally limiting compensation to physical invasions,48 the
Court allowed regulatory limitations²even those stripping the property of all
or nearly all value²so long as those regulations were within the non-arbitrary
execution of the extraordinarily broad police power.49 Indeed, during this time,
any argument for compensation resulting from action short of direct a physical
appropriation was hardly rational in thH&RXUW¶VH\HV.50
The exception to this narrow line of interpretation is Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co.,51 a case in which the Supreme Court for the first time applied the Takings
Clause to governmental action short of taking title.52 Specifically, the Court in
Pumpelly held that the continuous flooding of property by a government dam
was an unconstitutional taking that required compensation.53 Analyzing the
44. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250±   ³>7KH )LIWK $PHQGPHQW]
contain[s] no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This Court
FDQQRWVRDSSO\WKHP´ see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (2018); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 114±
15; Treanor, supra note 17, at 794 n.69. State courts, on the other hand, dealt with the takings issue a
fair amount through their own state constitutions. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 106±14.
45. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 792, 795; Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 53 (2017). But see Thomas, supra note 28, at 532±33 (arguing that
compensation for takings consistently extended not only to land that was actually physically taken).
46. 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
47. Id. at 551 (emphasis added); see also Treanor, supra note 17, at 796.
48. Also known as the power of eminent domain. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 4.
49. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667±70 (1887) (holding that private property
could be regulated pursuant to the police power without compensation, regardless of the impact on the
property¶V value); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 4; BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12,
at 117±20.
50. Legal Tender Cases  86 DW  VWDWLQJ WKDW RQO\ D ³EROG PDQ´ ZRXOG DVVHUW VXFK D
theory).
51. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
52. Treanor, supra note 17, at 795 n.74 (noting that Pumpelly VHUYHGDVWKHOLPLWWRWKH&RXUW¶V
strict interpretation).
53. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 181.
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takings issue, the Court stated that an absolute physical taking is not required
for there to be a compensable taking ZKHUH SULYDWH SURSHUW\ LV ³DFWXDOO\
invaded . . . or . . . [has] any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually
destroy or impair [the] XVHIXOQHVV´RIWKHSURSHUW\54
Straying little from the strict rule of the Legal Tender Cases,55 Pumpelly is
nonetheless quite significant because of its previously unrecognized rationale.56
While promptly limited in scope and application,57 Pumpelly revealed a
changing perception of the Takings Clause. Through its deference to
circumstantial equity, the Court showed its willingness to broaden the
application of the Takings Clause²a willingness fully realized roughly fifty
years later in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.58

54. Id.
55. Treanor, supra note 17, at 796 n.74 (noting that Pumpelly still required sustained actual or
consequential physical interference with the property²D ³GH IDFWR SK\VLFDO WDNLQJ´²to trigger the
compensation requirement).
56. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177±(YHQWKHGLVVHQWUHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKHPDMRULW\¶VDQDO\sis²
finding a taking in something less than an actual physical appropriation²ZDV D ³YHU\ FXULRXV DQG
XQVDWLVIDFWRU\UHVXOW´JRLQJ³WRWKHXWWHUPRVWOLPLWRIVRXQGMXGLFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ´Id.
57. See, e.g., Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (noting that Pumpelly was
WKH³H[WUHPHVWTXDOLILFDWLRQRIWKH>WDNLQJV@GRFWULQH´ZKLFKWRWKDWSRLQWGLGQRWOLPLW³DFWVGRQHLQ
the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not GLUHFWO\HQFURDFKLQJXSRQSULYDWHSURSHUW\´ ; see
also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 117± H[SODLQLQJKRZWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQMugler
expressly limited the holding in Pumpelly).
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). It is also important to note that the incorporation of the Takings Clause
KHOSHGVHWWKHVWDJHIRUWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQMahon. Indeed, the incorporation of the Takings Clause
in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896), was a major breakthrough for
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493 (1977). In the regulatory takings context,
application of the Takings Clause to state action through incorporation pushed more state regulatory
issues to the fore of the takings analysis, forcing the courts to address issues such as that presented in
Mahon. E.g., Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412 (analyzing a state law issue on review from a state supreme
court).
As a side, it is also interesting to note that there is some disagreement regarding whether Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago formally incorporated the Takings Clause. See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 141 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1978) (stating
summarily that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago incorporated the Takings Clause);
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 18 (noting that the Takings Clause was incorporated through Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago). C.f., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited:
Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 829±30, 875±
93 (2006) (noting that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago case failed to even
mention the Fifth Amendment or the Takings Clause and was decided solely on Fourteenth
Amendment due process terms).
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D. The Regulatory Takings Revolution: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶Vgenerally narrow construction of the Takings Clause
continued until the revolution that was -XVWLFH +ROPHV¶s opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon59²³perhaps the single most important
GHFLVLRQ LQ WKH WDNLQJV OLWHUDWXUH´60 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the
jurisprudential significance of this shift away from the limited and generally
accepted understanding of the Takings Clause.61
Mahon began as a suit over the statutory diminution of property value and
contract rights for a coal mining company conducting operations in and around
Scranton, Pennsylvania.62 The statute at issue, the Kohler Act, prohibited coal
mining that threatened certain surrounding structures by placing substantial
regulatory restrictions on the pre-existing rights of mining companies.63 Rather
than adhere to the predictable baseline established by the Legal Tender Cases,
Justice Holmes trained WKH&RXUW¶V analysis on the extent to which such purely
regulatory restrictions are justified.64 The Supreme Court thus admitted²for
the first time in its Takings Clause jurisprudence²that there are limits to the
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSXUHO\UHJXODWRU\SRZHU65
Unfortunately, the Court provided no clear test for the determination of
ZKHQ D UHJXODWLRQ LV RI VXFK D ³PDJQLWXGH´ DV WR UHTXLUH FRPSHQVDWLRQ66
Instead, Justice Holmes applied a subjective, fact-intensive inquiry that
ZHLJKHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUHVWDJDLQVWWKHSURSHUW\LQWHUHVWDWVWDNH67 Out
of this pliable balancing test focused on the ill-GHILQHG³TXHVWLRQRIGHJUHH´68

59. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
60. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12.
61. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2055. Chief Justice William Rehnquist called Mahon ³WKH
IRXQGDWLRQ RI RXU µUHJXODWRU\ WDNLQJV¶ MXULVSUXGHQFH´ .H\VWRQH %LWXPLQRXV &RDO $VV¶Q Y
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), and the Court rightly stated that
-XVWLFH +ROPHV¶s RSLQLRQ ³JDYH ELUWK WR RXU UHJXODWRU\ WDNLQJV MXULVSUXGHQFH.´ Tahoe±Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v7DKRH5HJ¶O3ODQQLQJ$JHQF\, 535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002).
62. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412, 414.
63. Id. at 412, 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64. Id. DW  ³2QH IDFW IRU FRQVLGHUDWLRQ . . . LV WKH H[WHQW RI WKH GLPLQXWLRQ´ RI WKH YDOXH
resulting from the regulation.). Justice Holmes believed that, if the Takings Clause were to be limited
RQO\WRSK\VLFDOWDNLQJV³WKHQDWXUDOWHQGHQF\RIKXPDQQDWXUH>ZRXOGEH@WRH[WHQGWKHTXDOLILFDWLRQ
PRUHDQGPRUHXQWLODWODVWSULYDWHSURSHUW\GLVDSSHDUV´Id. at 415.
65. Id. at 413. Interestingly, Mahon was perhaps the culmination of a career in which Holmes
sought a limitation on the police power. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 798±99.
66. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
67. Id. at 413±16.
68. Id. at 416; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
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-XVWLFH+ROPHVH[WUDFWHGD³FU\SWLF´69 UXOH³while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.´70
Thus, in one fell swoop, Justice Holmes and the Court unceremoniously
disposed of decades of Supreme Court precedent by holding that purely
regulatory actions were within the purview of the Takings Clause.71 Holmes
reasoned that this approach was justified because even ³DVWURQJSXEOLFGHVLUH
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
E\DVKRUWHUFXWWKDQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOZD\RISD\LQJIRUWKHFKDQJH´72
Mahon signaled two significant changes in the Takings Clause doctrine.
First, it recognized that purely regulatory governmental action may rise to the
level of an unconstitutional taking that requires just compensation.73 Second,
+ROPHV¶s IRUPXODWLRQUHTXLULQJFRPSHQVDWLRQZKHQUHJXODWLRQVJR³WRRIDU´74
has left the Court without clear direction for nearly a century.75 Yet today, the
&RXUW¶V FRQWLQXHG VWUXJJOH WR FOHDUO\ GHILQH WHUPV and provide a cogent
framework is an unfortunate characteristic of the regulatory takings doctrine.76

69. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
70. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
71. See Harrington, supra note 29, at 2055. In dissent, Justice Brandeis put up a commendable
ILJKWVWDWLQJWKDW³>U@HVWULFWLRQXSRQXVHGRHVQRWEHFRPHLQDSSURSULDWHDVDPHDQVPHUHO\EHFDXVHLW
deprives the owner of the only XVHWRZKLFKWKHSURSHUW\FDQWKHQEHSURILWDEO\SXW´Mahon, 260 U.S.
at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis also argued that the state is not required to resort to
eminent domain for regulatory takings. Id. at 418. Additionally, Justice Brandeis shrewdly identified
DQDO\WLFDOLVVXHVLQ-XVWLFH+ROPHV¶s opinion, including the difficulties of determining the base value
of the property to be considered under this new regulatory takings doctrine²an issue that would come
to be known as the denominator factor. Id. at 419.
72. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
73. Property rights proponents argue that this development positively changed conceptions about
property rights and private use. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 811±12.
74. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (2005).
75. Treanor, supra note 17, at 782; see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)
(³5esolution of each case . . . ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application
of logic.´ Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto86   ³$VKDVEHHQDGPLWWHGRQQXPHURXV
occasions, this Court has generally been unable to develop any set formula for determining when
justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action must be deemed a
comSHQVDEOHWDNLQJ´  LQWHUQDOTXRWDWLRQmarks omitted).
76. See Treanor, supra note 17, at 782; see also Shelby D. Green, One Parcel Plus One Parcel
Equals a “Parcel as a Whole”: 0XUUY:LVFRQVLQ¶V Fluid Calculations for Regulatory Takings, PROB.
& PROP., -DQ)HEDW 10 (2018). Wisconsin courts have also expressed their frustration with the
lack of clear standards. See Noranda Exploration, Inc. v. Ostrom, 335 N.W.2d 596, 602 (1983) ³The
problem of how to distinguish between an unconstitutional taking and a police power regulation is a
difficult one, and the decisions of the Supreme Court have not made it less difficult.´ .
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III. THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE PRIOR TO MURR
Although consistently applied in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,77
Mahon was not significantly extended or developed until Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,78 a case which sparked rapid, often
unpredictable changes to the regulatory takings doctrine. This section attempts
to make sense of the confusing muddle79 of regulatory takings law as it stood
when the Supreme Court took up Murr²particularly those aspects relevant to
the Supreme &RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ in Murr.
The oft-repeated, judicially created ³SXUSRVHRIWKH7DNLQJV&ODXVH . . . is
to prevent the government from µforcing some people alone to bear the public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.¶´80 To these ends, case law indicates that courts conducting a regulatory
WDNLQJV DQDO\VLV VKRXOG ³DLP>@ WR LGHQWLI\ UHJXODWRU\ DFWLRQV WKDW DUH
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.´81 With this
unsatisfyingly amorphous basis in mind, regulatory takings cases can generally
be placed in one of four categories: (1) the regulatory taking that is also
FRXQWHULQWXLWLYHO\ ³SK\VLFDO´ LQ QDWXUH,   ³D Lucas-type total regulatory
WDNLQJ´  ³DPenn Central 7DNLQJ´RU  ³a land-use exaction violating the´
Nollan–Dolan standards.82 This section provides the relevant considerations
and analysis for the first three.83
77. See, e.g., Delaware, Lackawanna, & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193
(1928) (citing Mahon favorably in the context of takings and the police power); United States v. Cent.
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (noting that the test for takings claims is circumstantial
pursuant to Mahon); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (observing that
governmental regulation can ³be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires
FRPSHQVDWLRQ´ 
78. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Blais, supra note 45, at 54.
79. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 2016-2017, at 131, 133 (2017). Regulatory takings law has, perhaps, best been characterized as
³D PL[ RI SHUVH UXOHVDQG EDODQFLQJ WHVWV ZLWK DQ DPSOH DPRXQW RI DPELJXLW\ WKURZQ LQ´ 5REHUW
Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 307, 328 (2007); see also
Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for
Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 54±55 (2017).
80. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617±18 (2001) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
81. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Robert
Meltz, Substantive Takings Law: A Primer 18 (Oct. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
82. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. 7KH IRXUWK FDWHJRU\ ODUJHO\ FRQWUROOHG E\ WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Horne v. Dep’t of
Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2  LVLUUHOHYDQWWRWKH&RXUW¶VDQDO\VLVLQMurr and is therefore
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The first two categories are distinct because a regulatory action falling
ZLWKLQHLWKHU³JHQHUDOO\ZLOOEHGHHPHG>D@SHUVHWDNLQJ>@IRU)LIWK$PHQGPHQW
SXUSRVHV´84 )LUVW UHJXODWLRQV WKDW FRPSHO SURSHUW\ RZQHUV ³WR VXIIHU D
permanent physical invasion of her property²KRZHYHU PLQRU´ GHPDQG MXVW
compensation.85 Second, compensation is required where the regulation denies
³all economically productive or beneficial uses RI ODQG´86 The precise
DQDO\WLFDO XQGHUSLQQLQJV RI WKLV VHFRQG ³WRWDO WDNLQJV´ DSSURDFK KRZHYHU
remain unclear and any analysis typically requires substantial factual
background to determine whether all beneficial use of the relevant parcel has
been denied by the regulation.87
A. Penn Central Analysis
The third and most conceptually problematic category²still largely
LQIRUPHG E\ WKH &RXUW¶V DQDO\VLV LQ Penn Central88²asks whether a
government regulation goes too far, resulting in a compensable taking.89 The
difficulties here spring from the noted absence in Penn Central of DQ\ ³VHW
IRUPXOD´ WR JXLGH WKH DQDO\VLV and the admitted ³FRQVLGHUDEOH GLIILFXOW\´ LQ
outside the purview of this comment. For further analysis of this category, see Meltz, supra note 79,
at 366±70.
84. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
85. Id. (emphasis added). Just compensation is required for permanent physical appropriations
EHFDXVH VXFKDFWLRQ³GRHV QRWVLPSO\ WDNH DVLQJOH µVWUDQG¶ IURP WKH µEXQGOH¶ RISURSHUW\ ULJKWV it
chops through the bundleWDNLQJDVOLFHRIHYHU\VWUDQG´/RUHWWR v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (emphasis added).
86. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (emphasis added). As clarified
by Tahoe–Sierra³>D@Q\WKLQJOHVVWKDQDµFRPSOHWHHOLPLQDWLRQRIYDOXH¶RUDµWRWDOORVV¶´VWLOOUHTXLUHV
the Penn Central ³DGKRF´ fact intensive analysis. Tahoe±Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. Y7DKRH5HJ¶O
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326, 330 (2002) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019±20 n.8); see also
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Blais, supra note 45, at 59, 62±65; Meltz, supra note 79, at 331±32. There is
a significant exception to this rule where the regulations simply supplement background principles
already in place when the property owner acquired the land. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 329, 352±54.
Additionally, temporary moratoriums on property use do not necessarily result in a taking because time
is only one factor when considering whether there has been a total taking. See Tahoe±Sierra, 535 U.S.
at 321; see also Meltz, supra note 79, at 331 QRWLQJWKDW³XVH´LQWKLVVLWXDWLRQLVLQWHUFKDQJHDEOHZLWK
³YDOXH´ 7KXVDPRUDWRULXPULVLQJWRDOHYHORIDWDNLQJ²D³UHODWLYHO\UDUH´VLWXDWLRQLucas, 505
U.S. at 1018²FDQRQO\WDNHSODFHZKHUHWKHUHJXODWLRQVDUH³RISURVSHFWLYHO\LQGHILQLWHGXUDWLRQ´
Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 18); see also Tahoe–Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
87. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030±7RGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUD³WRWDOWDNLQJs´KDVWDNHQSODFH
courts must be able to identify the relevant parcel²the denominator of the fraction²a difficult task in
its own right. See discussion infra Section III.B.
88. It is, of course, frustrating that the Supreme Court continues to rely on a forty-year-old
IUDPHZRUNVWLOOPLUHGLQ³ad hocery´0HOW]supra note 81 (manuscript at 21) (emphasis added).
89. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
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determining what constitutes a taking.90 But, in an effort to provide some
DQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUNWKH&RXUWLQWURGXFHG³VHYHUDOIDFWRUV´WRVHUYH³DVWKH
principal guideliQHVIRUUHVROYLQJUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVFODLPV´91 These factors²
 ³>W@KHHFRQRPLFLPSDFWRIWKHUHJXODWLRQRQWKHFODLPDQW´  ³WKHH[WHQW
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
H[SHFWDWLRQV´DQG  ³WKHFKDUDFWHURIWKH JRYHUQPHQWDODFWLRQ´92²require a
³FDUHIXO H[DPLQDWLRQ DQG ZHLJKLQJ RI DOO WKH UHOHYDQW FLUFXPVWDQFHV´93
Unfortunately, as the following discussion demonstrates, these standards are
WKHPVHOYHV³PHUHJXLGHSRVWV´DQGGRQRWJLYHFOHDUGLUHFWLRQIRUdetermining
when a regulation results in an unconstitutional taking.94
The Penn Central DQDO\VLV³WXUQVLQODUJHSDUW´95 upon the first factor: the
³HFRQRPLF LPSDFW RI WKH UHJXODWLRQ´96 &RQVLVWHQW ZLWK -XVWLFH +ROPHV¶s
analysis in Mahon, courts must consider the degree of loss to determine whether
a taking has occurred.97 $ ³PHUH GLPLQXWLRQ LQ SURSHUW\ YDOXH´²even
depriving a parcel of its most profitable use²is not enough to work a taking.98
Rather, courts must determine ZKHWKHU WKH UHJXODWLRQ LV WKH ³IXQFWLRQDO
HTXLYDOHQW´RIDSK\VLFDOWDNLQJ99
The second Penn Central factor considers whether the regulation has
deprived the property RZQHU RI UHDVRQDEOH ³LQYHVWPHQW-backed
H[SHFWDWLRQV´100 While the Court in Penn Central unsurprisingly failed to
specify exactly what this means²or even whose investment-backed
expectations were to be considered²it did focus the analysis on the original
cost basis of the property right rather than the fair market value of the property

90. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123±24 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538±39.
91. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538±39.
92. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
93. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6   2¶&RQQRU-FRQFXUULQJ 
94. Meltz, supra note 81; Meltz, supra note 79, at 329±30, 333. The indeterminacy of these
standards may be why the Court has never found a taking where this framework has been applied. See
Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 20).
95. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
96. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
97. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 334; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
98. Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 21); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131; Concrete Pipe
& Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
99. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 334; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. The first factor also requires that
WKHGHJUHHRIHFRQRPLFLPSDFWEHEDODQFHGDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHUHJXODWLRQMahon,
260 U.S. at  ³*RYHUQPHQWKDUGO\FRXOGJRRQLI, to some extent, values incident to property could
QRWEHGLPLQLVKHGZLWKRXWSD\LQJIRUHYHU\VXFKFKDQJHLQWKHJHQHUDOODZ´ 
100. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
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right at stake at the time of the alleged taking.101 7KLV³UDWH-of-UHWXUQ´IRUPXOD
UHTXLUHVWKDW³LQYHVWPHQW-EDFNHGH[SHFWDWLRQV´EH  PRUHWKDQD³XQLODWHUDO
H[SHFWDWLRQRUDQDEVWUDFWQHHG´102 and (2) consistent with the conditions under
which the expectations were developed.103 Furthermore, it has been recognized
that no taking occurs simply because the governmental UHJXODWLRQ ³HQGV DQ
economically beneficial circumstance that [the property owner] would like to
FRQWLQXH´²WKHUH PXVW EH VRPH ³LQYHVWPHQW-backed expeFWDWLRQ´ VXSSRUWLQJ
that benefit.104 The second Penn Central factor thus encompasses a host of
considerations for determining the reasonableness of a property RZQHU¶V
expectations.105
The third Penn Central factor DQDO\]HV³WKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHJRYHUQPHQW
actLRQ´106 This²the most flexible and least important Penn Central
factor107²VWULNHV FORVHO\ DW WKH ³SXUSRVH´ RI UHJXODWRU\ WDNLQJV GRFWULQH:
³prevent[ing] the government from µforcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.¶´108 Under this factor, WKHJRYHUQPHQWFDQQRWPHUHO\³UHFKDUDFWHUL]H as
SXEOLF SURSHUW\ ZKDW ZDV SUHYLRXVO\ SULYDWH SURSHUW\´ WKDW LV QR OHVV D
FRPSHQVDEOH WDNLQJ ³WKDQ LI WKH VWDWH KDG SK\VLFDOO\ DSSURSULated it or
GHVWUR\HG LWV YDOXH E\ UHJXODWLRQ´109 Additional principles indicate that

101. See Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to
Clean up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 151, 169 (2017); Meltz, supra
note 81 (manuscript at 25) (³7KH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI H[SHFWDWLRQV ZDV SUREDEO\ LQWHQGHG E\ Penn
Central WREHDVVHVVHGXQGHUODZH[LVWLQJZKHQWKHSURSHUW\ZDVDFTXLUHG´).
102. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005±06 (1984) TXRWLQJ:HEE¶V)DEXORXV
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
103. Id. at 1007. Thus, to the extent buyers are or should be aware that their holdings are subject
to regulation, their reasonable expectations cannot be contrary to those background principles. Meltz,
supra note 79, at 340. In this way, the expectations must be (1) actual and (2) objectively reasonable.
Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 24).
104. Meltz, supra note 79, at 317 (emphasis omitted).
105. Timing considerations also play a role in the development of reasonable investment-backed
expectations. Although the taking of title post-regulation does not per se deprive the new owner of the
right to assert a claim, see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001), such timing will make
the demonstration of reasonable investment-backed expectations exceedingly difficult, see Meltz,
supra note 79, at 323±24.
106. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
107. Meltz, supra note 79, at 341±42.
108. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617±18 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
109. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. 'HS¶WRI(QYWO3URW, 560 U.S. 702, 713, 715
(2010); see also :HEE¶V)DEXORXV3KDUPacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (³>$@6WDWH
by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . .´).
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governmental action must have a direct adverse impact on the property to
constitute a taking,110 and takings need not be permanent to be compensable.111
This third Penn Central factor is particularly difficult because it requires
courts to balance public interest against the burden of the regulation upon the
private property owner.112 Justice Holmes focused on this balancing in Mahon,
framing regulatory takings as an express limitation on the otherwise legitimate
police power.113 But the practical working out of this limitation is quite
difficult. In LingleWKH&RXUWVWDWHGWKDW³LIDJRYHUQPHQWDFWLRQLVIRXQGWREH
impermissible . . WKDWLVWKHHQGRIWKHLQTXLU\´114 Nevertheless, the Court
DOVRQRWHGWKDWMXGJHVPXVW³UHPDLQFRJQL]DQWWKDWJRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQ²by
definition²LQYROYHVWKHDGMXVWPHQWRIULJKWVIRUWKHSXEOLFJRRG´115 In short,
ZKLOH WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK ³SROLFH SRZHU´ FRQVLGHUDWLRQV FRQWULEXWH WR WKLV
analysis remains unclear, recognizing and understanding the weight of the
police power interests at play is important for a thorough takings analysis.116
110. Meltz, supra note 79, at 321.
111. See Ark. *DPHDQG)LVK&RPP¶QY8QLWHG6WDWHV, 568 U.S. 23 (2012); see also id. at 38
(³:KHQUHJXODWLRQRUWHPSRUDU\SK\VLFDOLQYDVLRQE\JRYHUQPHQWLQWHUIHUHVZLWKSULYDWHSURSHUW\RXU
decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable
WDNLQJ´).
112. See Meltz, supra note 81 (manuscript at 27); see also Thomas, supra note 28, at 546
GLVFXVVLQJWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIWKH³SROLFHSRZHU´and concluding that the police power is traditionally
limited to nuisance suppression and does not MXVWLI\DUHJXODWRU\³WDNLQJ´ZLWKRXWMXVWFRPSHQVDWLRQ 
113. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (³7KHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHSROLFH
power [has EHHQ@VWUHWFKHG>WRR@IDU´). With this focus, Mahon should perhaps have been read as a
due process case rather than a Takings Clause case. See Karkkainen, supra note 58, at 862±65, 870,
874. The balancing against the police power approach reached its peak in Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980), where the Court required an analysis of whether the applicable regulation
³VXEVWDQWLDOO\DGYDQFH>V@ legitimate state interests´ Id. at 260; see also Meltz, supra note 79, at 356.
This test, however, proved too involved and the Court pared it back in Lingle, stating that the police
power analysis is derived from due process principles rather than a Takings Clause analysis. Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005); see also Meltz, supra note 79, at 313. The overlap
between these two theories still exists and presents an interesting question: What role should the police
power hold in the regulatory takings analysis? Id. at 314.
114. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
115. Id. at 538.
116. See Meltz, supra note 79, at 324±27; Thomas, supra QRWH  DW  QRWLQJ WKDW ³WKH
modern U.S. Supreme Court has not been clear or consistent about what it believes is the operating
EDVLVRIWKHSROLFHSRZHU´HVSHFLDOO\LQWKHUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVFRQWH[W 2QHWKHRU\LVWKDWDQ\DQDO\VLV
RIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDFWLRQVLQWKH7DNLQJV&ODXVHFRQWH[WVKRXOGIRcus solely on the
Armstrong principles: considering whether there is an arbitrary singling out of individuals or discrete
and insular classes of property owners for harsher treatment than the rest²whether to benefit other
identifiable individuals or classes or to benefit the public generally. See Karkkainen, supra note 58, at
912. Another theory is that, as the police power was originally understood as limited to dealing with
nuisance abatement, any governmental regulation on property that extends beyond this traditional
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B. Denominator of the Fraction
Perhaps the most critical consideration in evaluating whether a regulation
works a total taking or goes too far is the determination of what makes up the
³SDUFHO DV D ZKROH´²WKH ³GHQRPLQDWRU RI WKH IUDFWLRQ´²the base against
which the economic impact of the regulation is weighed.117 This often
outcome-determinative issue118²the central issue in Murr and applicable to
three of the four categories of regulatory takings119²is rooted in Penn Central¶V
statement that courts must consider the pDUFHODVDZKROHUDWKHUWKDQ³GLYLGe a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
DSDUWLFXODUVHJPHQWKDYHEHHQHQWLUHO\DEURJDWHG´120 The Court elaborated on
WKLV ³DQWL-VHJPHQWDWLRQ´ SULQFLSOH LQ Andrus v. Allard ³where an owner
SRVVHVVHVDIXOOµEXQGOH¶RISURSHUW\ULJKWVWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIRQHµVWUDQG¶of
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its

boundary requires compensation. Thomas, supra note 28, at 546. Regardless of the precise analysis,
RQHWKLQJVHHPVFOHDU³YLUWXDOO\DOOUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVFRQWURYHUVLHVWRGD\´UHVXOWIURPVRPHDOOHJHG
over-expansive use of what is often lDEHOHGDVWKH³SROLFHSRZHU´Id. at 500.
117. .H\VWRQH%LWXPLQRXV&RDO$VV¶QY'H%HQHGLFWLV, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). The Court
LGHQWLILHGWKHGHQRPLQDWRULVVXHDVD³GLIILFXOWSHUVLVWLQJTXHVWLRQ´Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 631 (2001); see also Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 223, 253
(2017).
118. See Daniel L. Siegel, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine
Help to Define the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV.      ,QGHHG ³>D@ FRXUW¶V
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHSDUFHODVDZKROHPD\HDVLO\GHFLGHWKHFDVH´0HOW]supra note 79, at 347.
119. The exception is the Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., physical invasion
principle. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,  QRWLQJWKDW³DSHUPDQHQWSK\VLFDO
invasion . . . KRZHYHUPLQRU´UHquires just compensation); see also +RUQHY'HS¶WRI$JULF, 135 S.
Ct. 2419, 2429 (2015).
120. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130±31 (1978). This statement
and the &RXUW¶VVXEVHTXHQWSUDFWLFHRILGHQWLI\LQJWKHUHOHYDQWSDUFHOZDVD³QHFHVVDU>\@GHSDUW>XUH@´
IURP-XVWLFH+ROPHV¶s formulation in Mahon which concluded that there was a regulatory taking where
LWEHFDPH³FRPPHUFLDOO\ LPSUDFWLFDEOH´ WRFRQGXFW WKH GHVLUHG DFWLYLW\ RQ WKH ODQG (SVWHLQ supra
note 101, at 164.
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HQWLUHW\´121 While generally supporting this anti-segmentation principle,122 the
Court has nonetheless failed to provide a solid definition for the parcel as a
whole.
One of the primary suggestions for a consistent denominator formula was
JURXQGHGLQ-XVWLFH6FDOLD¶VDQDO\VLVLQLucas:
The answer to this difficult [denominator] question may lie in
KRZWKHRZQHU¶VUHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVKDYHEHen shaped by
WKH6WDWH¶VODZRISURSHUW\²i.e., whether and to what degree
the relevant SWDWH¶V ODZ KDV DFFRUGHG OHJDO UHFRJQLWLRQ DQG
protection to the particular interest in land with respect to
which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or
elimination of) value.123
This elaboration, however, was subsequently critiqued as only ³dictum´124
based on VXJJHVWLRQVDQG³>J@HQHUDO>LWLHV@´125 In the face of this incoherence,
the arguments before the Supreme Court in Murr presented an opportunity to
clarify this important aspect of the regulatory takings doctrine.126
IV. THE MURR PROBLEM
7KH GLVFXVVLRQ QRZWXUQV WR WKH:LVFRQVLQ VWDWH FRXUWV¶DSSURDFK WRWKH
regulatory takings issue, the substantial regulatory framework behind the Murr
case, and the facts that led to the case.
121. See 444 U.S. 51, 65±66 (1979). The anti-VHJPHQWDWLRQSULQFLSOHLVEDVHGRQWKH&RXUW¶V
statement that WKH³µEXQGOH¶ RISURSHUW\ULJKWV´PXVWEHYLHZHGDVDZKROHDQG³WKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIRQH
µVWUDQG¶RIWKHEXQGOH´RUWKHWRWDO³GHQLDORIRQHWUDGLWLRQDOSURSHUW\ULJKW´GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\ZRUN
a taking. Id. The test for regulatory takings requires a comparison of the value taken to the value that
remains in the property, emphasizing the importance of determining the denominator of the fraction.
.H\VWRQH%LWXPLQRXV&RDO$VV¶QY'H%HQHGLFWLV, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). For example, there was
no taking in Tahoe–Sierra because the Court refused to segment the value of the property based on
time. See Tahoe±Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. Y7DKRH5HJ¶O3ODQQLQJ$JHQF\86  
Similarly, in Concrete Pipe, the Court reiterated the need to focus on the whole property. See Concrete
Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993).
122. ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDW³>W@KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKROGVRXWDIHZproperty rights as being of
a particularly fundamental nature,´VXFKWKDWDQ\UHJXODWLRQRIWKDW³VWUDQG´FRQVWLWXWHVDWDNLQJ0HOW]
supra note 79, at 320, 350, 3607KHVHLQFOXGH  WKHULJKWWR³SK\VLFDOO\H[FOXGHRWKHUV´DQG  WKH
ULJKWWR³SDVVRQSURSHUW\WRRQH¶VKHLUV´Id. at 320±21.
123. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016±17 n.7 (1992); see also Bd. of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (noting WKDW³>S@URSHUW\LQWHUHVWV . . are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
VRXUFHVXFKDVVWDWHODZ´ Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003±04 (1984) (noting that
property rights are informed by rights created under state law).
124. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946 (2017).
125. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. 'HS¶WRI(QYWO3URW, 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010).
126. See infra Section V.A.
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A. Wisconsin Courts and Regulatory Takings
A regulatory takings claim in Wisconsin is brought pursuant to either the
Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution127 or the substantively similar Article
I, Section 13 in the Wisconsin Constitution.128 ³$OWKRXJKSKUDVHGLQVOLJKWO\
GLIIHULQJWHUPV´:LVFRQVLQ¶VUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVMXULVSUXGHQFHODUJHO\PLUURUV
United States Supreme Court precedent.129 Specifically, there are three relevant
DUHDVLQZKLFK:LVFRQVLQ¶VUHJXODWRU\WDNings jurisprudence mirrors that of the
Supreme Court.
First, Wisconsin law allows for a regulatory taking claim where the
governmental regulation has the same effect as a physical appropriation. 130
Second, the Penn Central factors²   ³WKH FKDUDFWHU RI WKH governmental
DFWLRQ´  ³WKHHFRQRPLFLPSDFWRIWKHUHJXODWLRQRQWKHFODLP>@´DQG  ³WKH
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
H[SHFWDWLRQV´131²are also central to the regulatory takings analysis under
Wisconsin Law.132 Third, the threshold determination for when the regulation

127. ³>1@RU VKDOO SULYDWH SURSHUW\ be taken for public use, without just compensation.´ U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
128. ³7KH SURSHUW\ RI QR SHUVRQ VKDOO EH WDNHQ IRU SXEOLF XVH ZLWKRXW MXVW FRPSHQVDWLRQ
WKHUHIRU´WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13.
129. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531 (1996). The
procedure for bringing a takings claim is, however, unique under Wisconsin law. First, inverse
condemnation claims must be brought under Wisconsin Statutes section 32.10 (1983)²a statute
providing a remedy when the government fails to follow procedure in acquiring private property²
ZKHUHWKHUHLV³DJRYHUQPHQW-imposed restriction depriv[ing] the owner of all, or substantially all, of
WKHEHQHILFLDOXVHRIKLVSURSHUW\´E±L Enters. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶
37, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 112±13, 785 N.W.2d 409, 425 (2010) (The court did note, however, that use of
the statute is not requirHG WR HQIRUFH RQH¶V ULJKW WR MXVW FRPSHQVDWLRQ   :LWKLQ WKLV IUDPHZRUN
:LVFRQVLQ &RXUWV RQO\ UHFRJQL]H D UHJXODWLRQ DV D ³WDNLQJ´ ZKHUH   WKHUH LV D OHJDOO\ LPSRVHG
UHVWULFWLRQXSRQWKHSURSHUW\¶VXVHid. ¶ 41, by (2) a governmental entity with the authority to impose
such a restraint. +RZHOO3OD]D,QFY6WDWH+LJKZD\&RPP¶Q, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 86, 284 N.W.2d 887,
893 (1979). Thus, simple consequences of government regulatory action do not rise to the level of a
taking. E-L Enters., 2010 WI 58, ¶ 41. Additionally, under the second factor, the police power
MXVWLILFDWLRQV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DFWLRQV VWLOO VHHP WR FDUU\ VRPH ZHLJKW ZLWKLQ :LVFRQVLQ¶V
regulatory takings framework. Brian W. Ohm, Towards a Theory of Wisconsin Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 4 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 191±93 (1997).
130. Compare E–L Enters., 2010 WI 58, ¶ 22 (A claim for a taking exists where the government
HQDFWV D UHJXODWLRQ WKDW LV ³VR RQHURXV WKDW its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation´ 
(emphasis added) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)), with Lingle,
supra, at    VWDWLQJWKDWFRXUWVPXVWGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHUHJXODWLRQLVWKH³IXQFWLRQDOO\
equivalent´WRDSK\VLFDOWDNLQJ 
131. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
132. See Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 374.
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has reached the level of a taking is extremely high under both Wisconsin and
Supreme Court jurisprudence.133
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has independently developed its own unique
take on certain aspects of the regulatory takings doctrine.134 For example,
Wisconsin courts have taken a distinct approach to the analysis of a property
RZQHU¶V UHDVRQDEOH LQYHVWPHQW-backed expectations. Under Wisconsin case
ODZ DQ RZQHU ³KDV QR DEVROXWH DQG XQOLPLWed right to change the essential
natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
XQVXLWHGLQLWVQDWXUDOVWDWHDQGZKLFKLQMXUHVWKHULJKWVRIRWKHUV´135 Thus,
reasonable investment-backed expectations²even those expectations held at
the time of the investment²cannot include the unnatural development of land;
WKDWWKHRZQHUFDQVWLOOXVHWKHODQGIRUXVHVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWV³HVVHQWLDOQDWXUDO
FKDUDFWHU´ LV HQRXJK WR LQVXODWH WKH JRYHUQPHQW IURP D WDNLQJV FODLP 136
$OWKRXJK ³OLPLWHG WR WKH FRQWH[W RI HQYLURQPHQWDO OHJLVODWLRQ´137 this
extremely narrow formulation of investment-backed expectations severely
limits property rights by charging the property owners with knowing that their

133. 7KH FULWLFDO TXHVWLRQ XQGHU :LVFRQVLQ¶V UHJXODWRU\ WDNLQJV IUDPHZRUN LV ZKHWKHU WKH
SURSHUW\ RZQHU KDV EHHQ GHQLHG ³DOO RU VXEVWDQWLDOO\ DOO SUDFWLFDO XVHV RI >WKH@ SURSHUW\´ Id. The
RZQHU¶VUHWHQWLRQRIVRPH³VXEVWDQWLDOXVH>@´²any regulatory deprivation of value that falls short of
WKH XQVSHFLILHG DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\ YDJXH ³DOO RU VXEVWDQWLDOO\ DOO´ WKUHVKROG²relieves the
government of the burden to pay just compensation. Id. at 380. Additionally, it is irrelevant which
VSHFLILFSURGXFWLYHXVHVDUHGHQLHGDOOXVHVPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGWRJHWKHUDQG³DOORUVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOO´
must be denied by the regulation. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 334 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1983).
Note the slight variation from LucasLQZKLFKWKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQZDVZKHWKHUWKHUHJXODWLRQ³GHQLHV
DOOHFRQRPLFDOO\EHQHILFLDORUSURGXFWLYHXVHRIODQG´Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015 (1992); Gregory S. Alexander, ‘Takings’ Jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court: The Past 10
Years, in CORNELL LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, 857, 864 (1996) (nRWLQJWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
application of the Penn Central Standards has rarely resulted in the Court finding that a regulation is a
³WDNLQJ´ 
134. Ohm, supra note 129, at 175±76 (1997). Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has often
developed standards later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Brian W. Ohm, Wisconsin Takings Law–
A Brief Historical Perspective, U. OF WIS.- MADISON DEP¶T OF URBAN AND REG¶L PLANNING 12±13
(1995), https://dpla.wisc.edu/sites/dpla.wisc.edu/files/inlinefiles/ohm%20wisconsin%20takings%20law%20a%20brief%20historical%20perspective%20956.PDF [https://perma.cc/KPM3-9NT7] [hereinafter Wisconsin Takings Historical Perspective].
135. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972); see also Ohm,
supra note 129DW QRWLQJWKDWWKLVIRUPXODWLRQLVNQRZQDVWKH³SXEOLFKDUPEHQHILWUXOH´ R.W.
Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶ 32, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 517, 628 N.W.2d 781, 791 (2001).
136. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17; see also Ohm, supra note 129, at 211.
137. +RZHOO3OD]D,QFY6WDWH+LJKZD\&RPP¶Q, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 85, 284 N.W.2d 887, 892
(1979). This narrow formulation is not limited to the public trust doctrine; but also extends to other
types of environmental regulations. Ohm, supra note 129, at 208.
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ODQGPD\EH³KHDYLO\UHJXODWHGIURPWKHJHW-JR´forcing the owners to assume
the risk for severely limiting regulations.138
$OVRXQLTXHWR:LVFRQVLQ¶VUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVIUDPHZRUNLVLWVDSSURDFK
to the denominator question. When determining the property at issue,
Wisconsin courts often aggregate contiguous property segments as whole
parcels139²WDNLQJ WR DQ H[WUHPH WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V DQWL-segmentation
principle. To justify the aggregation of parcels, Wisconsin courts have
highlighted WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UHIXVDO WR HQGRUVH DQ\ WHVW WKDW VHJPHQWV
property or individual property rights for valuation purposes by placing
VLJQLILFDQW HPSKDVLV RQ WKH YDOXH RI WKH ³SURSHUW\ . . . DV D ZKROH´140 This
formulation further tilts the analysis in favor of the government. By
aggregating contiguous lots, courts give the government increased flexibility in
land use regulation, thereby decreasing the likelihood that a regulation limits
³DOORUVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOO´SUDFWLFDOXVHRIWKHLUSURSHUW\141
B. Murr’s Regulatory Background
The St. Croix River area along the Wisconsin±0LQQHVRWDERUGHULV³RQHRI
WKHPRVWXQVSRLOHGDQGSLFWXUHVTXHDUHDVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´142 But nearly
from the point of discovery by French Explorers in 1697, widespread
exploitation of natural resources in the riverbed area have threatened the
pristine state of this beautiful river and the surrounding woodlands.143 Over
time, the riverbed area has changed drastically at the hands of industry: from a
thick pine forest,144 to a fruitful farmland,145 to a recreation destination
cherished for its natural beauty.146
In the mid-1960s, increased urbanization in the Twin Cities metropolitan
area gave rise to contrasting visions for the future of the St. Croix River area.147

138. R.W. Docks and Slips, 2001 WI 73, ¶ 29.
139. See Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 375±76, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532 (1996).
140. Id. at 375±76.
141. Id. at 374.
142. Great Rivers Confluence Symposium 2018: Valuing 50 Years of the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, ST. CROIX 360 (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.stcroix360.com/2018/01/great-rivers-confluencesymposium-2018-valuing-50-years-of-the-wild-and-scenic-rivers-act/ [https://perma.cc/9D6ZQK7F].
143. See EILEEN M. MCMAHON & THEODORE J. KARAMANSKI, NORTH WOODS RIVER: THE ST.
CROIX RIVER IN UPPER MIDWEST HISTORY 21, 43±46, 56±59, 73±79, 85±120, 133±38 (2009).
144. Id. at 73.
145. Id. at 150±60.
146. Id. at 211±20.
147. Id. at 268±70.
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On one hand, environmentalists and recreationalists sought to preserve and
promote the natural beauty of the region.148 On the other hand, regional energy
FRPSDQLHV VRXJKW WR FDSLWDOL]H RQ WKH ULYHU¶V UHVRXUFHV and proposed the
construction of a coal-fired power plant and power-producing dams along the
river.149 In the face of this conflict, Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson
introduced federal regulations for the preservation of the St. Croix River area.150
These efforts were rewarded in 1968 when President Lyndon Johnson signed
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act into law.151 The Scenic Rivers Act, an effort to
³IXUWKHUWKHFDXVHRIFRQVHUYDWLRQ´JDYH³LPPHGLDWHSURWHFWLRQWRSRUWLRQVRI
HLJKWULYHUVDQGDULEERQRIODQGDORQJHDFKULYHUEDQN´LQRUGHUWR³SUL]HDQG
WR SURWHFW *RG¶V SUHFLRXV JLIWV´ RI DQ XQVSRLOHG HQYLURQPHQW IRU IXWXUH
generations.152 The Upper St. Croix River was one of the original eight rivers
designated for preservation under the Act.153 Protection was extended to the
Lower St. Croix River in 1972.154
The regulatory framework impacting the St. Croix River and underlying the
controversy in Murr is quite extensive. To most effectively preserve the natural
state of the St. Croix, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act emphasized collaboration
between state and federal agencies, ³[encouraging] [s]tates and their political
subdivisions . . . to cooperate in the planning and administration of components
RIWKHV\VWHP´155 Wisconsin, consistent with this call for collaboration, enacted
Wisconsin Statutes section  WR ³JXDUDQWHH WKe protection of the wild,
148. Id. at 269±70.
149. Id. at 270.
150. Id. at 270±75.
151. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90±542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
     7KLV $FW FUHDWHG D QDWLRQDO SROLF\ IRU WKH SUHVHUYDWLRQ RI ³FHUWDLQ VHOHFWHG
rivers . . . which . . . possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife,
historic, FXOWXUDORURWKHUVLPLODUYDOXHV´Id. § 1(b); see also Lyndon B. Johnson and the Environment,
NAT¶L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/lyjo/planyourvisit/upload/environmentcs2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NEN-SM5G]. 3UHVLGHQW -RKQVRQ VWDWHG WKH QHHG WR ³VXVWDLQ DQ HQYLURQPHQW
VXLWDEOHIRUPDQ>E\@NHHS>LQJ@WKHVH>ZLOGULYHUV@ZHKDYH´³>W@KHUHLVQRH[FXVH . . . to [use] our
PDMRUULYHUVDVSLSHOLQHVIRUWR[LFZDVWH´Id.
152. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 
1969, Book II²July 1, 1968 to Jan. 20, 1969, at 1000, 1002 (1970).
153. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 3(a)(6).
154. Lower Saint Croix River Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92±560, sec. 2, § 9, sec. 3, 86 Stat. 1174
(1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1968)); see also Classification of a Small Scenic Riverway, 40
Fed. Reg. 43,244 (Sept. 19, 1975) (³>7@KH /RZHU 6W &URL[ 5LYHU DQG LWV LPPHGLDWH HQYLURQPHQW
SRVVHVVRXWVWDQGLQJVFHQLFDQGHVWKHWLFUHFUHDWLRQDODQGJHRORJLFYDOXHV´DQG³VKRXOGEHSURWHFWHG
for thHEHQHILWDQGHQMR\PHQWRISUHVHQWDQGIXWXUHJHQHUDWLRQV´).
155. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § 10(e); Lower Saint Croix National Scenic Riverway, 41 Fed.
Reg. 26,236±37 (June 25, 1976); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (2012).
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scenic and recreational qualities of the river for present and future
JHQHUDWLRQV´156 5HFRJQL]LQJWKDWODQGGHYHORSPHQW³SRVHVWKHJUHDWHVWVLQJOH
WKUHDW WR PDLQWDLQLQJ D SOHDVDQW DQG VFHQLF ULYHU HQYLURQPHQW´157 section
30.27(2) directed the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and
impacted local governments to adopt zoning guidelines and standards that
³DSSO\WRWKHEDQNVEOXIIVDQGEOXIIWRSVRIWKH/RZHU6W&URL[5LYHU´158
Pursuant to these legislative directives, the Wisconsin DNR adopted
Wisconsin Administrative Code NR 118.159 St. Croix County eventually
followed, adopting an ordinance in lock-VWHS ZLWK WKH 6WDWH¶V FRGH160 The
language contained in the identical provisions and relevant to Murr¶V issue of
non-conforming substandard lots161 VWLSXODWHVWKDW³>D@GMDFHQWVXEVWDQGDUGORWV
in common ownership may only be sold or developed as separate lots if each
of the lots has at least one acre of net project area´162 The ordinance defined
³QHW SURMHFW DUHD´ DV WKH ³>G@HYHORSDEOH ODQG DUHD PLQXV VORSH SUHVHUYDWLRQ
zones, flood plains, road rights-of-ZD\DQGZHWODQGV´163 Mitigating the impact
of these regulations, a grandfather clause exempted ³substandard´ lots already
owned at the time of the implementation of the regulations.164 These
regulations constitute the regulatory framework at issue in Murr.
C. Factual and Procedural Background
The Murr family has long treasured its property on a bend of the beautiful
St. Croix River.165 The Murrs¶ parents purchased Lot F in 1960 and built a

156. WIS. STAT. § 30.27(1) (2018).
157. Classification of a Small Scenic Riverway, 40 Fed. Reg. at 43,246.
158. WIS. STAT. § 30.27(2)(a) (2018); see also WIS. STAT. § 30.27(3) (2018) (noting that the
State legislation required the impacted county, city, village, or town to adopt guidelines and standards
consistent with the DNR rules). Subsection 3 also enabled the DNR to adopt and enforce ordinances
where the local governing body failed to do so. Id.
159. See Joint Appendix at 7, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 13±214), 2016
WL 1459531; see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118 (July 1980).
160. See Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 7; see also ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF
ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4) (2005).
161. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
162. ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17,
sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4)(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added).
163. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.03(27) (November 2004); Joint Appendix, supra note 159,
at 26; ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17,
§ 17.09(160) (2017).
164. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4) (February 2012); ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF
ORDINANCES, LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4)(I)(4)(a)(2) (2005).
165. See Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 32.
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FDELQ RQ WKH ODQG EHIRUH WUDQVIHUULQJ WKH SURSHUW\ WR WKH IDPLO\¶V SOXPELQJ
company in 1961.166 In 1963, the parents also purchased Lot E²the lot at issue
in the litigation²this time holding the lot in their own names, intending to use
it as an investment property to be developed or sold separate from Lot F.167 The
Murrs held the two lots separately168 until the parents transferred the properties
in 1994 and 1995, respectively, to the joint ownership of their children.169
The two lots are very similar in layout: each has two plots of developable
land²an upper and lower plot²divided by a steep 130-foot bluff, and each
consists of approximately 1.25 acres in total area.170 But the combined ³QHW
SURMHFWDUHD´LVRQO\DFUHV171 Consequently, the transfer of the two lots to
the joint ownership of the children in 1995 triggered the aforementioned merger
provisions and the two lots effectively became one under state law.172
Around 2004, the family grew tired of repeated flooding at their communal
summer refuge and began discussions with the St. Croix Zoning Board in
HIIRUWV WR ³IORRG-SURRI´ WKHLU FDELQ173 To fund the necessary upgrades, the
family planned to sell the undeveloped Lot E.174 7KH\ZHUHKRZHYHU³TXLWH
IODEEHUJDVWHG´ ZKHQ WKH 6W &URL[ =RQLQJ %RDUG LQIRUPHG WKHP WKDW /RW (
could not be sold or developed as a separate lot because the merger provisions
had combined Lot E and Lot F.175 7KH0XUUVVRXJKWUHYLHZRIWKH%RDUG¶V
determination and applied for six variances and two special exception

166. Id. at 6; Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017).
167. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 6; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
168. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 6. Lot F was held by the family business and Lot E was
held by the parents. See id. Additionally, the properties were taxed separately through the end of 2012.
Id. at 24.
169. Id. at 6; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
170. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 29±30; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940; Murr v. St. Croix Cty.
Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 4, 332 Wis. 2d 172, 176±78, 796 N.W.2d 837, 841.
171. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (per
curiam) (unpublished). Lot E itself only has .5 acres of net project area. Joint Appendix, supra note
159, at 76.
172. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 14 (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE
NR § 118.08(4)(a)(i) (February 2012)) (noting that, upon the transfer of the property, the grandfather
clDXVH QR ORQJHU DSSOLHG   7KH WUDQVIHU RI WKH SURSHUW\ WR MRLQW RZQHUVKLS RI WKH ³VXEVWDQGDUG´
properties triggered the merger under both ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND
USE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 17, sub. III.V., § 17.36(I)(4) (2005) and WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR section
118.08(4) (February 2012).
173. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 76.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 93.
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permits.176 The Zoning Board rejected all applications, finding that they were
inconsistent with the objectives of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.177
2QDSSHDOWKH:LVFRQVLQFRXUWVDIILUPHGWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQDQGKHOGWKDW
WKHPHUJHURIWKHWZRVXEVWDQGDUGORWVSURSHUO\SUHVHUYHGERWK³SURSHUW\YDOXHV
DQGWKHHQYLURQPHQW´178
After exhausting the available administrative remedies, the Murrs were left
in a situation where Lot E was essentially rendered useless as an independent
parcel: the property could not be sold, developed, or even used for agricultural
purposes.179 Hoping to solve their dilemma, the Murr family brought a claim
seeking just compensation for the unconstitutional taking of its land.180 The
family argued that the merger provision artificially melded Lot E and Lot F
XQGHUVWDWHODZDQGGHSULYHG/RW(³RIDOORUSUDFWLFDOO\DOO´EHQHILFLDOXVHV
thus triggering an unconstitutional taking.181
The Wisconsin courts disagreed.
The circuit court granted the
JRYHUQPHQW¶V PRWLRQ IRU VXPPDU\ judgment, concluding that the Murrs¶
property²when viewed as a whole²retained some beneficial use.182 The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals then took up the case and provided a thorough
analysis of the SWDWH¶VWDNLQJVMXULVSUXGHQFH183 Focusing on the state cRXUWV¶
unique jurisprudential twist on the Penn Central parcel as a whole
terminology,184 the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court and held that the
contiguous lots should be viewed as a whole and, when viewed as such, the

176. Id. at 24; Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (2017); Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of
Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 5.
177. See Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 15; Joint Appendix, supra
note 159, at 66.
178. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, ¶ 14. The circuit court that
LQLWLDOO\ UHYLHZHG WKH %RDUG¶V GHFLVLRQ agreed with the rejection of the special exception permits
(denial to use or sell the lots separately) but disagreed with the rejection of the variances. Id. ¶¶ 2±3.
The Murrs appealed this decision and the court of appeals affirmed regarding the special exception
permit. Id. 7KH FRXUW RI DSSHDOV KRZHYHU GLG UHYHUVH WKH FLUFXLW FRXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH
variances, thereby DIILUPLQJ WKH %RDUG¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ DOO UHVSHFWV Id. ¶ 3. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court denied the petition for review. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2011 WI App 29, cert.
denied, 2011 WI 86, 335 Wis. 2d 146, 803 N.W.2d 849 (2011).
179. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 9.
180. Id. at 10; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933
(2017) (No. 15±214), 2015 WL 4932231.
181. Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 9±10.
182. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 31 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014)
(per curiam) (unpublished).
183. See id. ¶¶ 16±19.
184. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130±31 (1978).
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SDUFHO³UHWDLQVEHQHILFLDODQGSUDFWLFDOXVHDVDUHVLGHQWLDOORW´185 The court
UHDVRQHGWKDWWKH0XUUVZHUHZURQJWRDVVXPHWKDW³WKH\KDGDQXQIHWWHUHGULJKW
WRXVHWKHLUODQGDVWKH\SOHDVHGDWWKHLQFHSWLRQRIWKHLURZQHUVKLS´186 The
WUDQVIHUEURXJKWWKHORWVXQGHUFRPPRQRZQHUVKLSDQG³WKH0XUUVknew
or should have known WKDWWKHLUORWVZHUHµKHDYLO\UHJXODWHG¶´DQGHIIHFWLYHO\
merged by law at that point.187
Following denial of review at the Wisconsin Supreme Court,188 the United
States Supreme Court granted the MurrV¶ZULWRIFHUWLRUDUL.189
V. MURR AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Arguments of the Murr Family and the State of Wisconsin
In their petition for writ of certiorari, the Murrs argued that this case
presented the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve its longVWDQGLQJ³GLVFRPIRUW´ZLWKWKHGHILQLWLRQ RIWKH³GHQRPLQDWRULQWKHWDNLQJV
IUDFWLRQ´DJDLQVWZKLFKWKHGHFUHDVHLQYDOXHPXVWEHPHDVXUHG190 Considering
WKH³LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHLVVXH´191 the precise set of facts presented in the case,192
and the fact that state and federal law seem to conflict on this precise issue,193
WKH0XUUVDUJXHGWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVKRXOG³ILQDOO\DGGUHVV´WKH³FULWLFDO
TXHVWLRQ´RIZKDWPDNHVXSWKHSDUFHODVDZKROHLQWKHWDNLQJVDQDO\VLV194 The
Murrs suggested that, just as the Court has refused to adopt a principle of
segmentation,195 WKH&RXUWVKRXOGDOVRUHMHFW:LVFRQVLQ¶V³UXOH´RIDJJUHJDWLQJ

185. Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 317KH³FRQWLJXRXVQHVV´RIWKH0XUUV¶ property was
WKH³NH\IDFW´VXSSRUWLQJWKH³ZHOO-established rule that contiguous property under common ownership
LVFRQVLGHUHGDVDZKROHUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHQXPEHURISDUFHOVFRQWDLQHGWKHUHLQ´Id. ¶¶ 19±20.
186. Id. ¶ 29.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶ 31, cert. denied, 2015 WI 47, 366 Wis. 2d 59, 862
N.W.2d 899 (2015).
189. Murr v. State, 2014 WL 7271581, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 890 (Mem.) (2016).
190. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 180, at 13±14.
191. Id. at 15.
192. Id. at 14±17.
193. Id. at 17±21.
194. Id. at 11±12, 15.
195. As discussed previously, segmentation refers to the idea that individual rights within the
EXQGOHRIVWLFNVFDQEHVHSDUDWHGDQGDQDO\]HGLQGHSHQGHQWO\LQOLJKWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHJXODWLRQ
See 3HWLWLRQHUV¶%ULHIRQWKH0HULWVDW±15, Murr v. Wisconsin 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15±214),
2016 WL 1459199.
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contiguous properties.196 ,QVWHDGWKH0XUUVVXEPLWWHG³WKHentire fee title of a
single parcel is the parcel as a whole²WKH UHOHYDQW WDNLQJV XQLW´197 This
³JHRJUDSKLFDOO\GHILQHGSDUFHO´WKH\DUJXHGZRXOGEHPRVW³FRQVLVWHQWZLWK
WUDGLWLRQDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRISURSHUW\ODZ´DQGWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH198
The State, on the other hand, argued that state law should control the parcel
as a whole analysis.199 The State focused its DQDO\VLVRQWKH&RXUW¶VVXJJHVWLRQ
in Lucas WKDW ³WKH UHOHYDQW SDUFHO VKRXOG EH LGHQWLILHG E\ SURSHUW\ RZQHUV¶
REMHFWLYHO\ µUHDVRQDEOH H[SHFWDWLRQV¶ DV µVKDSHG E\ WKH 6WDWH¶V law of
SURSHUW\¶´200 $V WKH ³&RXUW KDV XQLIRUPO\ LGHQWLILHG WKH SURSHUW\ ULJKWV
SURWHFWHGE\WKH7DNLQJV&ODXVHDVWKRVHUHFRJQL]HGE\VWDWHODZ´WKH6WDWH
VXEPLWWHG WKDW LW ZRXOG EH ³HQWLUHO\ VHQVLEOH WR ORRN WR WKH UHDVRQDEOH
expectations shaped by that same state law when determining the relevant
µSDUFHO¶´201 7KH6WDWHFODLPHGWKDWWKLV³REMHFWLYHEDVHOLQH´ZRXOGFUHDWHPXFK
needed clarity in the regulatory takings doctrine.202
B. Murr v. Wisconsin: The Decision
Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion
Following a summary of Murr¶VIDFWXDODQGUHJXODWRU\EDFNJURXQG-XVWLFH
Kennedy noted the painfully obvious: Mahon IDLOHGWRSURYLGHDQ\³GHWDLOHG
JXLGDQFHIRUGHWHUPLQLQJ´ZKHQDUHJXODWLRQKDGJRQHWRRIDU203 The Justice
then framed the opinion by discussing thH &RXUW¶V UHJXODWRU\ WDNLQJV
jurisprudence²FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\³LWVIOH[LELOLW\´²LQOLJKWRI³WZRFRPSHWLQJ
REMHFWLYHV´  ³WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWRUHWDLQWKHLQWHUHVWVDQGH[HUFLVHWKH
IUHHGRPV DW WKH FRUH RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\ RZQHUVKLS´204 DQG   ³WKH

196. Id. at 16±19. Indeed, tKH0XUUVDUJXHGWKDWWKH:LVFRQVLQFRXUW¶V³UXOH´WKDWFRQWLJXRXV
SDUFHOVXQGHUFRPPRQRZQHUVKLSPXVWEHFRPELQHGLVFRQWUDU\WRWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGence. Id. at 19.
197. Id. at 23.
198. Id. at 24±29.
199. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin at 1, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. at 1933 (2017)
(No. 15± :/7KH6WDWHDUJXHGWKDWWKLVZDVHVSHFLDOO\WUXH³>J@LYHQWKDW>WKH@
takings analysis has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the
content of . .  WKH µEXQGOH RI ULJKWV¶ WKDW WKH\ DFTXLUH ZKHQ WKH\ REWDLQ WLWOH WR WKH SURSHUW\´ Id.
(quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)) (emphasis omitted).
200. Id. at 2 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7).
201. Id. at 24.
202. Id. at 25, 35.
203. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017).
204. Id. DW³[Private] [p]roperty rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property
ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where governments are
DOZD\VHDJHUWRGRVRIRUWKHP´Id. at 1943.
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goYHUQPHQW¶VZHOO-HVWDEOLVKHGSRZHUWRDGMXVWULJKWVIRUWKHSXEOLFJRRG´205
7KHEDODQFLQJRIWKHVHWZRFRQVLGHUDWLRQV³UHTXLUHVDFDUHIXOLQTXLU\LQIRUPHG
E\WKHVSHFLILFVRIWKHFDVH>ZLWKWKHDQDO\VLV@GULYHQµE\WKHSXUSRVHRIWKH
7DNLQJV&ODXVH¶´206 ThiVLQWURGXFWLRQIRFXVHGRQWKHLQKHUHQW³IOH[LELOLW\´ of
the regulatory takings analysis, only hinted at the vague test the majority was
about to produce.
Justice Kennedy then turned to the all-important denominator question:
³[w]hat is the proper unit of property against which to assess the effect of the
FKDOOHQJHGJRYHUQPHQWDODFWLRQ"´207 Refusing to implement a clear standard208
and rejecting the arguments of both the Murr family and the State of Wisconsin
as too formulistic,209 Justice Kennedy instead adopted a multi-factor test²
doubling down on the indeterminacy of the already problematic Penn Central
analysis.210 This test, objective in nature with reasonable expectations derived
205. Id. at 1937 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (highlighting -XVWLFH+ROPHV¶s
IDPRXVGHFODUDWLRQWKDW³>J@RYHUQPHQWKDUGO\FRXOGJRRQLIWRVRPHH[WHQWYDOXHVLQFLGHQWWRSURSHUW\
could not be diminished without paying for eveU\VXFKFKDQJHLQWKHJHQHUDOODZ´ . Id. at 1943; see
also Thomas, supra note 28, at 498±99 (discussing the arguments for and against a strict regulatory
taking doctrine).
206. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617±18 (2001)).
$VGLVFXVVHGSUHYLRXVO\WKLV³SXUSRVHRIWKH7DNLQJV&ODXVH . . . is to prevent the government from
µforcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.¶´Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617±18 (quoting Armstrong v. Unites States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
207. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
208. Id. DW,QGHHG-XVWLFH.HQQHG\QRWHGWKDW³QRVLQJOHFRQVLGHUDWLRQFDQVXSSO\WKH
H[FOXVLYHWHVWIRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHGHQRPLQDWRU´Id.
209. Id. at 1946. ,QVRGRLQJ-XVWLFH.HQQHG\GLVPLVVHGDV³XQGXO\QDUURZ´FRQFHSWVERWK  
WKHVLPSOHVHJPHQWDWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQG  WKHLGHDWKDW³SURSHUW\ULJKWVXQGHUWKH
Takings Clause should be coextensive with those unGHU VWDWH ODZ´ Id. at 1944. First, tKH 0XUUV¶
³SUHVXPSWLRQ WKDW ORW OLQHV GHILQH WKH UHOHYDQW SDUFHO LQ HYHU\ LQVWDQFH´ LV IODZHG EHFDXVH LW
³FRQWUDYHQHVWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZZKLFKUHFRJQL]HVWKDWUHDVRQDEOHODQG-use regulations do not work
DWDNLQJ´Id. at 1947. Because merger provisions such as the one at issue in this case are generally a
³OHJLWLPDWHH[HUFLVHRIJRYHUQPHQWSRZHU´WKH³KDUVKQHVVRIDPHUJHUSURYLVLRQPD\EHDPHOLRUDWHG
E\WKHDYDLODELOLW\RIDYDULDQFH´DQGDVWULFWDGKHUHQFHWRVWate lot line would frustrate the efforts of
ORFDO]RQLQJFRPPLVVLRQVDQGFUHDWHWKHULVNRIJDPHVPDQVKLSWKH0XUUV¶DUJXPHQWLV³SUREOHPDWLF´
Id. at 1947±48. SecondWKH6WDWH¶VDUJXPHQWZDVIDXOW\EHFDXVHW\LQJ³WKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHSDUFHOWR
state law . . . simply assumes the answer to the question.´Id. at 1946. ³6WDWHVGRQRWKDYHWKHXQIHWWHUHG
authority to shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, leaving
[property]-owners without recourse against unreasonablHUHJXODWLRQV´DVWKDWZRXOG³LPSURSHUO\ . .
IRUWLI\WKHVWDWHODZDJDLQVWDWDNLQJVFODLP´Id. at 1944±45 (internal quotation marks omitted). Also,
although the Court suggested in Lucas that state law may be determinative, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council86Q-XVWLFH.HQQHG\KHOGWKDWWKLVVXJJHVWLRQZDVRQO\³GLFWD´DQGLV
merely one factor of consideration. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946±47.
210. See Brady, supra note 79, at 55.
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³IURPEDFNJURXQGFXVWRPVDQGWKHZKROHRIRXUOHJDOWUDGLWLRQ´LQFOXGHVWKUHH
IDFWRUV³>@WKHWUHDWPHQWRIODQGXQGHUVWDWHDQGORFDOODZ>@WKHSK\VLFDO
characteristics of the land; and [3] the prospective value of the regulated
ODQG´211 &RXUWV DUH WR XVH WKHVH IDFWRUV WR ³GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU UHDVRQable
expectations about property ownership would lead a [property owner] to
anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as
VHSDUDWHWUDFWV´212
)LUVWFRXUWVPXVW³JLYHVXEVWDQWLDOZHLJKW´WR ³the treatment of the land
under stDWHDQGORFDOODZ´213 Although a takings claim is not invalid per se
EHFDXVHRISUHH[LVWLQJUHJXODWLRQV³DUHDVRQDEOHUHVWULFWLRQ´WKDWDOUHDG\H[LVWV
RULVWULJJHUHGDWWKHWLPHSURSHUW\LVWUDQVIHUUHG³FDQEHRQHRIWKHREMHFWLYH
factors that most landowners would reasonably consider in forming fair
H[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWWKHLUSURSHUW\´214 Thus, in the formulation of reasonable
expectations, property RZQHUV PXVW ³DFNQRZOHGJH OHJLWLPDWH UHVWULFWLRQV´ DW
WKHVWDWHDQGORFDOOHYHOWKDWDIIHFWWKH³XVHDQGGLVSensation of the SURSHUW\´215
6HFRQG FRXUWV PXVW FRQVLGHU WKH ³SK\VLFDO FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´ RI WKH
property.216 6SHFLILFDOO\WKHFRXUWVVKRXOGDQDO\]H³WKHSK\VLFDOUHODWLRQVKLS
RI DQ\ GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH WUDFWV WKH SDUFHO¶V WRSRJUDSK\ DQG WKH VXUURXQGLQJ
human DQGHFRORJLFDOHQYLURQPHQW´217 Special relevance is to be given where
SURSHUW\LVLQDUHDV³VXEMHFWWRRUOLNHO\WREHFRPHVXEMHFWWRHQYLURQPHQWDO
RURWKHUUHJXODWLRQ´218
7KLUG³FRXUWVVKRXOGDVVHVVWKHYDOXHRIWKHSURSHUW\XQGHUWKHFKDOOHQJHG
regulation, with special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of
RWKHU KROGLQJV´219 ,Q WKLV ZD\ FRXUWVDUH WR IRFXV RQZKHWKHU DQ\ ³VSHFLDO
UHODWLRQVKLS´220²some type of value-based complementarianism, though not
necessarily economic in nature221²between the holdings may mitigate any

211. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1945±$UHDVRQDEOHFULWLFRI-XVWLFH.HQQHG\¶VWKHRU\PLJKWDVNwhat areas are
QRW³VXEMHFWWRRUOLNHO\WREHFRPHVXEMHFWWRHQYLURQPHQWDORURWKHUUHJXODWLRQV"´
219. Id. at 1946.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1949. ³7KRXJKDXVHUHVWULFWLRQPD\GHFUHDVHWKHPDUNHWYDOXHRIWKHSURSHUW\WKH
effect may be tempered if the regulated land adds value to the remaining property, such as by increasing
privacy, expaQGLQJUHFUHDWLRQDOVSDFHRUSUHVHUYLQJVXUURXQGLQJQDWXUDOEHDXW\´Id. at 1946; see also
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QHJDWLYH HIIHFW RI D UHJXODWLRQ  7KH DEVHQFH RI VXFK D ³VSHFLDO
relationship . . . may counsel against consideration of all the holdings as a
VLQJOHSDUFHO´222
Applying this multifactor test, the Court concluded that Lot E and F should
be aggregated and evaluated together as the relevant parcel.223 Regarding the
first factor, the Murrs¶ ³YROXQWDU\FRQGXFWLQEULQJLQJWKHORWVXQGHUFRPPRQ
RZQHUVKLSDIWHUWKHUHJXODWLRQVZHUHHQDFWHG´WULJJHUHGWKHPHUJHUXQGHUVWDWH
and local law and created what should have been WKH³UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQ´
that the lots would be treated as a single parcel.224 Applying the second factor,
the contiguousness of the lot lines, the natural limitations of potential uses of
the lots, and the location of the lots along a highly protected riverway were all
physical characteristics that supported the treatment of the lots as a unified
parcel.225 The third factor²looking to the value of the property under the
challenged regulations²also supported the consideration of the lots as a single
parcel because the enhanced combined value of the lots, as opposed to their
lower
valuation
when
viewed
indepeQGHQWO\ ³VKRZV WKHLU
FRPSOHPHQWDULW\´226 In short, due to their own actions, the unique location of
their land, and the complimentary value of the property, the Murrs should have
expected that their land would be significantly burdened by governmental
regulations.227
Justice Kennedy thus affirmed the Wisconsin Court of AppealV¶ decision
UHJDUGLQJWKHGHQRPLQDWRUWKH0XUUV¶SURSHUW\VKRXOGEHDQDO\]HG³DVDVLQJOH
XQLW´228 And viewing the two lots together as a single parcel, the Murrs failed
WR³HVWDEOLVKD FRPSHQVDEOHWDNLQJ´229

Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 253±54 (observing that this third factor is a
³VLJQLILFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWRWDNLQJVODZ´ 
222. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
223. Id. at 1948.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1948±49.
227. Garnett, supra note 79, at 143.
228. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949.
229. Id. Indeed, there was no taking under Lucas¶ ³WRWDO WDNLQJV´ IUDPHZRUN EHFDXVH ³>W@KH
property ha[d] noWORVWDOOHFRQRPLFYDOXH´Id. Similarly, there was no taking under the Penn Central
analysis because the economic impact of the regulations was not severe, the Murrs had no reasonable
expectations to sell or develop the lots separately due to the regulations predating their ownership of
WKHORWVDQGWKH³JRYHUQPHQWDODFWLRQZDVDUHDVRQable land-XVHUHJXODWLRQ´Id.
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Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent230
Despite his agreement with the ultimate conclusion reached by the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts authored a strong dissent.231 The Chief Justice argued
WKDWWKHPDMRULW\KDG³>JRQH@DVWUD\´232 with its ³HODERUDWHWHVW´233 DQG³FRPSOH[
VHWRIIDFWRUV´234 ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLV³VWDQGDJDLQVWVLPSOLFLW\´235 Chief Justice
Roberts introduced exactly what Justice Kennedy and the majority said could
QRW H[LVW D ³VLPSOH WHVW´236 %HFDXVH ³>V@WDWH ODZV GHILQH WKH ERXndaries of
GLVWLQFWXQLWVRIODQG´WKRVHVWDWHODZERXQGDULHVVKRXOGEHXVHGWRGHWHUPLQH
WKH UHOHYDQW SDUFHO ³LQ DOO EXW WKH PRVW H[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV´237 The
&KLHI -XVWLFH UHDVRQHG WKDW WKLV DSSURDFK LV ³HQWLUHO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK Penn
Central´ DQG ZRXOG QRW EH VXVFHSWLEOH WR ³JDPHVPDQVKLS´²as the majority
suggested²at the hands of either property owners or the government.238 State
ODZE\³FUHDW>LQJ@GLVWLQFWSDUFHOVRIODQGDQGGHILQ>LQJ@WKHULJKWVWKDWFRPH
DORQJZLWKRZQLQJ>WKHVH@SDUFHOV´ZRXOG be the ideal basis for determining
the relevant parcel against which to weigh the effect of the governmental
regulation.239

230. Justice Thomas also authored an insightful dissent, in which he suggested that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause would provide a better basis for the regulatory takings claim. See id. at 1957
(Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally John Greil, Second-Best Originalism and Regulatory Takings,
41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL¶Y 373 (2018); Jonathan H. Adler, Should Regulatory Takings Doctrine be
Reconsidered
from
the
Ground
Up?,
WASH.
POST
(June
23,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/should-regulatorytakings-doctrine-be-reconsidered-from-the-ground-up/?utm_term=.6dd2e3beb467
[https://perma.cc/6BL2-QKFJ].
231. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950. Indeed, under the existing regulatory takings doctrine, it would
be difficult to come to the opposite conclusion. As Justice Kagan submitted at oral arguments, the
0XUUVFRXOGQRWWDNH³KDOIRI SWDWHODZ´²the half defining lots lines²while ignoring the other half²
the presumably legitimate governmental regulation at issue in this case. Transcript of Oral Argument
at 16, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15±214), 2017 WL 1048381.
232. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1954.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1953.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1954. Moreover, this approach would be the only logical one considering the relevant
parcel in the regulatory takings analysis has always been identified pursuant to principles of state
property law. Garnett, supra note 79, at 133, 139. But the majority knocks this stable definition of
SURSHUW\³ORRVHIURPLWVIRXQGDWLRQ . . . DQGWKURZVLWLQWRWKHPDHOVWURPRIPXOWLSOHIDFWRUV´PDNLQJ
the identification of the relevant parcel a takings-VSHFLILF ³MXGJPHQW FDOO´ LQIRUPHG E\ WKH
³Ueasonableness of the regulation´Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955±57 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Additionally, the Chief Justice noted that the PDMRULW\RSLQLRQ³XQGHUPLQHV
the effectiveness of the Takings Clause as a check on thHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRZHU´
to infringe upon personal property rights.240 7KHPDMRULW\¶VPRYHDZD\IURP
the baseline of state property law principles allows the government to argue for,
DQGFRXUWVWRFUHDWH³DOLWLJDWLRQ-VSHFLILFGHILQLWLRQRIµSURSHUW\¶´WKDWgives
XQGXH ZHLJKW WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHJXODWRU\ LQWHUHVWV241 Under this
IRUPXODWLRQWKH³JRYHUQPHQW¶VJRDOVVKDSHWKHSOD\LQJILHOGEHIRUHWKHFRQWHVW
RYHUZKHWKHUWKHFKDOOHQJHGUHJXODWLRQJRHVµWRRIDU¶HYHQJHWVXQGHUZD\´242
Indeed, the property owneU LV QRZ IRUFHG WR SURYH WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
regulations are unreasonable when simply seeking to identify the relevant
parcel for the takings analysis.243 Thus, in the clash between the government²
UHSUHVHQWLQJ WKH ³FRPPRQ JRRG´²and the interests of individual property
owners, the already inherent imbalance against the property owner is only
PDJQLILHG³GRXEOH-counting to tip the scales in favor of the goveUQPHQW´244
VI. RESPONSE TO THE DECISION
A. Academic Reaction to the Decision
0DQ\FRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHH[SUHVVHGGLVDSSRLQWPHQWLQWKH&RXUW¶VIDLOXUH
to clean up this important aspect of the regulatory takings doctrine245 and the
GHFLVLRQ¶V SDUWLFXODUO\ KDUVK impact on personal property rights.246 Justice
.HQQHG\ SXWWLQJ ³OHJDO LQJHQXLW\ LQWR LQWHOOHFWXDO RYHUGULYH´ LQWURGXFHG D
IOH[LEOH³ODXQGU\OLVWRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´IRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQW
parcel²for the first time defining property under the Takings Clause as a

240. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1955.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See generally Brady, supra note 79; Epstein, supra note 101, at 151±52; Garnett, supra note
79; Green, supra note 76; Charles M. Kassir, Note, Murr-ky Waters: How Murr v. Wisconsin Creates
Uncertainty in Attempting to Answer the “Denominator Question´  MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 73
(2018).
246. See Ilya Somin, A Loss for Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin, WASH. POST (June 23,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/a-loss-forproperty-rights-in-murr-v-wisconsin/?utm_term=.9e252c35d65d [https://perma.cc/33XH-S7P2]; see
also Roger Pilon, Another Bleak Supreme Court Decision for Property Rights, WASH. EXAMINER
(June 28, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/another-bleak-supreme-court-decision-forproperty-rights/article/2627245 [https://perma.cc/7RW5-H3JH]. Indeed, Murr ³IXUWKHU XQGHUPLQHG
WKH DOUHDG\ HQIHHEOHG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO ULJKWV HQMR\HG E\ SURSHUW\ RZQHUV DJDLQVW UHJXODWRU\ H[FHVV´
Garnett, supra note 79, at 131.
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matter of federal common-law.247 This unfortunate development fails to
³DGYDQFHDQ\FRQFHSWLRQRIIDLUQHVVDQGMXVWLFH´EXWUDWKHULQWURGXFHVQHZDQG
³PDVVLYH OHYHOV RI ad hocery´ LQWR DQ DOUHDG\ LOO-defined framework.248
Furthermore, the doubling down on factor tests only compounds the Penn
Central LQGHWHUPLQDF\FUHDWLQJ³Penn Central VTXDUHG´249 It would have been
IDU EHWWHU WR IROORZ WKH &KLHI -XVWLFH¶V DSSURDFK WKDW ZRXOG ³VWDELOL]H
expectations as to the denominator of the regulatory-WDNLQJVIRUPXOD´250
3DUWLFXODUO\FRQFHUQLQJLV-XVWLFH.HQQHG\¶VKLMDFNLQJRIWKH³UHDVRQDEOH
H[SHFWDWLRQV´ RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\ RZQHUV  ,Q WKH &RXUW¶V QHZ GHQRPLQDWRU
DQDO\VLVWKH³UHDVRQDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQV´RIWKHSURSHUW\ RZQHUDUH³NLQJ´251 Yet
somewKDW FRXQWHULQWXLWLYHO\ ³>N@QRZOHGJH EHFRPHV VXUUHQGHU´ LQ WKDW WKH
more an individual property owner knows²or should know²about the
JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHJXODWLRQ RU LQWHQWLRQ WR UHJXODWH LQ D JLYHQ DUHD WKH PRUH
insulated they become from a successful takings claim.252 The obvious danger
of this approach is in its flexibility: the government and the courts can twist
WKHVHYDJXHVWDQGDUGVWRIXUWKHUFHPHQWDV³UHDVRQDEOH´DQ\VWDWHUHJXODWRU\
VFKHPHWKDW³SXUSRUW>V@WRDGYDQFHWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW´RUWKDWKDVDSarallel in
another jurisdiction.253 Thus, perhaps the greatest question following Murr is
whether courts will allow such manipulation or will rather give proper weight
to the reasonableness of the property RZQHU¶VH[SHFWDWLRQV254
247. Epstein, supra note 101, at 175; see also Garnett, supra note 79, at 141±42; Brady, supra
note 79, at 55±56. The holding in Murr also poses a severe risk to property federalism. Id. This is
OLNHO\ KRZHYHU WKH ORJLFDO ZRUNLQJ RXW RI WKH &RXUW¶V PLVSODFHG LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI WKH )LIWK
$PHQGPHQW¶V7akings Clause. See Karkkainen, supra note 58, at 831.
248. Epstein, supra note 101, at 175, 178.
249. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 231, at 35 (statement of Wisconsin Solicitor
General Misha Tseytlin); see also Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 259; Brady,
supra note 79, at 54±55.
250. Epstein, supra note 101, at 178.
251. Sara K. Beachy, Regulatory Takings: U.S. Supreme Court Announces New Test in
Wisconsin
Case,
INSIDE
TRACK
(July
5,
2017),
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=9&Issue=13&Ar
ticleID=25710 [https://perma.cc/S7RT-R8XT].
252. Epstein, supra note 101, at 180. Notice, for example, that in the analysis of Murr, Justice
Kennedy failed to consider actual expressed expectations of the Murrs, instead focusing on what the
Murrs should have expected. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017).
253. Garnett, supra note 79, at 146±48; see also Luke A. Wake, The Enduring (Muted) Legacy
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Quarter Century Retrospective 25 (April 28, 2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2960341
[https://perma.cc/B5F2-YCQA].
254. See Wake, supra note 253 (manuscript at 25). Also concerning for individual property
RZQHUV LV WKH &RXUW¶V OLPLWHG DQDO\VLV RI ZKHWKHU WKH UHJXODWLRQV ZHUH ZLWKLQ :LVFRQVLQ¶V SROLFH
power. Epstein, supra note 101, at 179. Indeed, the Court only briefly noted that the land use regulation
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,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH PDMRULW\¶V decision only further muddles the regulatory
takings doctrine in lower court systems across the nation. The shift away from
the straightforward baseline of constitutional property federalism presents
lower courts²especially at the state level²with a much more complex
analysis.255 Murr¶V factor-driven approach to determining the objective
reasonableness of the regulatory action will likely lead²although certainly not
require256²courts to consider analogous regulatory frameworks employed by
other jurisdictions.257 7KLV VHHPLQJO\ XQUHVWULFWHG DQDO\VLV RI ³PXOWL-state
QRUPV´ would undoubtedly lead to inconsistent application by courts at every
level and further tilt the scales against individual property owners. 258
B. Wisconsin Law in the Wake of Murr
1. :LVFRQVLQ+RPHRZQHUV¶%LOORI5LJKWV
7KRXJKWKH0XUUV¶FODLPZDVXOWLPDWHO\GHQLHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWWKH
HQGLQJ WR WKH IDPLO\¶V VWRU\ LV D KDSS\ RQH WKDQNV WR WKH :LVFRQVLQ
Legislature.259 Even before the final decision in Murr, Wisconsin lawmakers
hDG EHJXQ ZRUN RQ D ELOO WR VORZ ³WKH FUHHS RI RYHUEHDULQJ JRYHUQPHQW´
was legitimate, primarily focusing the discussion on WKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDFWLRQDVLW
relates to the reasonableness of the property RZQHU¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. This
approach, signals the further erosion of any perceived restrictions on the police power within the
context of regulatory takings doctrine. See discussion supra note 115.
255. See Brady, supra note 79, at 55±56; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of
Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 92±101 (2005) (describing the value of state competition
in property forms); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
   QRWLQJWKDWEHFDXVHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQGRHVQRW³UHTXLUHWKDWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURSHUW\EH
crHDWHG LQ DQ\ SDUWLFXODU IRUP´ LW ³SHUPLWV VXEVWDQWLDO H[SHULPHQWDWLRQ DQG HYROXWLRQ RI SURSHUW\
LQVWLWXWLRQVRYHUWLPH´ )UDQN,0LFKHOPDQProperty, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310 (19  ³>,@W LV D
commonplace of Our Federalism that [rules of property] are left for definition by bodies of state law
WKDWWKH6WDWHVDUHIUHHWRVKDSHDVWKH\VHYHUDOO\FKRRVH´ 6WHZDUW(6WHUNThe Federalist Dimension
of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 217±18, 222±24 (2004) (noting scholarly
inattention to this aspect of takings law and overviewing how states differently define constitutional
property).
256. As noted in Section VI.B.2, it does not appear that courts are bound to consider regulations
of other jurisdiction when conducting this part of the analysis. Therefore, focusing on the laws within
the relevant jurisdiction would be a better baseline against which to determine whether the property
RZQHU¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVDUHLQGHHGUHDVRQDEOH
257. See Brady, supra note 79, at 66±68.
258. See id. at 68±69.
259. See Mike Longaecker, Top 10: Murrs ‘Will Remember this Year for the Rest of Our Lives’,
HUDSON STAR OBSERVER (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.hudsonstarobserver.com/news/crime-andcourts/4379288-top-10-murrs-will-remember-year-rest-our-lives [https://perma.cc/KZJ8-GMMA].
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UHVSRQVLEOH IRU ³LPSHULOHG SURSHUW\ ULJKWV DQG KRPHRZQHUVKLS´260 This
proposed legislation included property rights reforms focused precisely on the
types of regulations at issue in Murr.261 The embattled Murr family became the
IDFHRIWKLVHIIRUWKHOSLQJSXVKWKHOHJLVODWXUH¶V³FRPPRQVHQVHELOO´DFURVV
WKH*RYHUQRU¶VGHVNOHVVWKDQVL[PRQWKVDIWHUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ262
The Act makes several significant changes to :LVFRQVLQ¶VODZE\OLPLWLQJ
the regulatory power of local government zoning boards.263 For example, the
Act requires local governments to grant conditional use permits²like those
sought by the Murrs at the outset of their legal battle264²so long as the
applicDQW ³PHHWV RU DJUHHV WR PHHW DOO RI WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG FRQGLWLRQV
VSHFLILHGLQ>WKDWORFDOJRYHUQPHQW@RUGLQDQFH´265 Furthermore, those imposed
FRQGLWLRQVRUUHTXLUHPHQWVPXVWEH³UHODWHGWRWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHRUGLQDQFHDQG
be based on substantial evidenFH´266 As an added protection, the applicant
may, following the required showings of the respective parties, directly appeal
WRWKHFLUFXLWFRXUWDORFDOERDUG¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHQ\WKHSHUPLWRUYDULDQFH267
3HUWDLQLQJVSHFLILFDOO\WRWKH0XUUVDUHWKH$FW¶Vadditional protections for
homeowners seeking to build on, or convey the ownership rights to,
substandard lots.268 Under the Act, no local government may prohibit a
SURSHUW\ RZQHU IURP   ³FRQYH\LQJ DQ RZQHUVKLS LQWHUHVW LQ D VXEVWDQGDUG
ORW´RU  ³>X@VLQJDVXEVWDQGDUGORWDVDEXLOGLQJVLWH´VRORQJDVWKHQHFHVVDU\
conditions or requirements have been met.269 Additionally, the Act preempts
ORWPHUJHUSURYLVLRQVLPSOHPHQWHG³ZLWKRXWWKHFRQVHQWRIWKHRZQHUVRIWKH

260. Press Release, Wisconsin Legislature, Tiffany and JaUFKRZ5ROO2XW³+RPHRZQHUV¶%LOORI
Rights´ 1 (June 8, 2016), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/12/tiffany/media/1351/2016-06-08homeowner-bill-of-rights-pr-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBW4-ZNJR].
261. Id. at 1±2. Points 4, 5, and 9 of the memorandum all focused precisely on the types of
regulations that led to the takings claim in Murr. Id.; see also Groen, supra note 2.
262. Longaecker, supra note 259. See generally 2017 Wis. Act 67.
263. Those aspects not relevant to the issue at hand and, therefore, not further discussed in this
FRPPHQW DUH   D VWUHQJWKHQLQJ RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO SURSHUW\ RZQHU¶V ULJKWV WR FRQWLQXH WR GHYHORS
nonconforming structures, (2) a limited change to the treatment of variances, and (3) a prohibition on
KRPHRZQHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVDQGKRXVLQJFRRSHUDWLYHVIURPLVVXLQJDJUHHPHQWVUHVWULFWLQJWKHULJKWVRI
members to fly the United States flag. See HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 2±4; 2017 Wis. Act
67.
264. See Joint Appendix, supra note 159, at 8.
265. WIS. STAT. §§ 59.69(5e)(b), 60.61(4e)(b), 60.62(4e)(b), 62.23(7)(de)(2)(a) (2018).
266. WIS. STAT. § 60.61(4e)(b)(1) (2018).
267. HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 2; see also WIS. STAT. §§ 59.69(5e)(e), 60.61(4e)(e),
60.62(4e)(e), 62.23(7)(de)(5) (2018).
268. HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 3.
269. WIS. STAT. § 66.10015(2)(e) (2018).
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ORWVWKDWDUHWREHPHUJHG´270 Thus, pursuant to these changes, the Murrs are
now free to either sell or develop lot E as they see fit. More broadly, these
provisions provide robust protections to property owners across the state and
will serve as substantial barriers to the enforcement of unauthorized local
regulations.271
2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court and the New Murr Standard
At least from a jurisprudential perspective, the Wisconsin courts seem to
have gotten Murr right. Not only was the state court of appeals¶ decision
affirmed, but the Supreme Court also adopted a comprehensive, multi-factor
test like that employed by the Wisconsin courts.272 Nevertheless, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court must now reconsider its regulatory takings analysis²especially
that pertaining to the denominator factor²following Murr. This section
analyzes two possible approaches: (1) creating a clearer definition of the
denominator under Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution; or (2)
narrowly construing Murr¶V IDFWRU WHVW WR SUHYHQW IXUWKHU deterioration of
personal property rights.

270. WIS. STAT. § 227.10(2p) (2018).
271. 7KRVHWKDWTXHVWLRQWKHYDOLGLW\RUSRWHQWLDOVXFFHVVRIWKH:LVFRQVLQ+RPHRZQHUV¶%LOORI
Rights should consider the continued success of similar legislation passed following Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court decimated the
³SXEOLFXVH´UHTXLUHPHQWRIWKH7DNLQJV&ODXVHId. at 484, 489±90. (In Kelo, the court held that the
transfer of property from one private property RZQHU WR D SULYDWH FRPSDQ\ VROHO\ IRU ³HFRQRPLF
GHYHORSPHQW´ZDVMXVWLILHGDV D³SXEOLFXVH´ )ROORZLQJWKDWFDVHVWDWHV²including Wisconsin²
LPSOHPHQWHG WKHLU RZQ YHUVLRQ RI D ³KRPHRZQHUV¶ ELOO RI ULJKWV´ WDLORUHG WR DGGUHVV WKH &RXUW¶V
decision. See HENNING & GROSZ, supra note 8, at 3±4; see also Nick Sibilla, Landowner’s Bill of
Rights Are Not “Suggested Guidelines,” Georgia Supreme Court Rules, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/11/03/landowners-bill-of-rights-are-notsuggested-guidelines-georgia-supreme-court-rules/#192bfd481ebe [https://perma.cc/GE3V-Q5QL].
Considering the success of the acts in other states, Wisconsin residents should rest assured that their
property rights have been effectively bolstered and will be upheld by courts should a political
subdivision impose upon these newly established rights. For example, in City of Marietta v.
Summerour, 807 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2017), tKH*HRUJLD6XSUHPH&RXUWKHOGWKDWWKH6WDWH¶VKRPHRZQHUV¶
bill of rights passed in the wake of Kelo ZDV QRW³PHUHO\ VXJJHVWHG JXLGHOLQHV´IRUVWDWHDQG Oocal
ordinances, id. DWEXWUDWKHULV³PRVWUHDVRQDEO\XQGHUVWRRGDVPDQGDWRU\,´ id. at 331.
272. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945±46 (2017); see also discussion supra pp. 27±
28 (discussing Murr at the court of appeals). Notably, Wisconsin courts have historically been a leader
in the area of regulatory takings law. See Ohm, supra note 129, at 175±76. For example, seven years
prior to the regulatory takings revolution in Mahon, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that it was
ZLWKLQ ³WKH MXGLFLDO SRZHU WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKH LQWHUIHUHQFH JRHV so far as to violate some
guaranteed right´ Mehlos v. City of Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 601, 146 N.W. 882, 885 (1914)
(emphasis added); see also Wisconsin Takings Historical Perspective, supra note 134, at 12.
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a. New Federalism: Independent Interpretation of the Takings Clause
Under the Wisconsin Constitution
“[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their
citizens the full protections of the federal constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law. The legal
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not
be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state
law—for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot
be guaranteed.”
— Justice William J. Brennan273
Through the incorporation of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
federal constitutional claims have inundated state courts,274 thrusting them to
the front lines of federal constitutional interpretation.275 As a result, litigators
and judges alike began to focus solely on federal constitutional claims in state
courts and failed to analyze or even raise separate arguments under parallel state
constitutional provisions.276 The majority of states have even adopted a
lockstep approach²or something very near it²to the interpretation of parallel
This development has
state and federal constitutional provisions.277
XQIRUWXQDWHO\ ³DUUHVWHG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI VWDWH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO ODZ´ DQG
individual rights under state constitutions have begun to lose their
significance.278
The abandonment of protections under state constitutions has led some
legal theorists, judges, and even state courts to embrace New Federalism²the
EHOLHI³WKDWWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKH>6XSUHPH@&RXUWDUHQRWDQGVKRXOGQRWEH

273. Brennan, supra note 58, at 491.
274. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1147±  >KHUHLQDIWHU$EUDKDPVRQ@ ³7KH8QLWHG
6WDWHV 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GRFNHW VKRZV WKH SHUYDVLYHQHVV RI IHGHUDO FRQVWLWXWLRQal issues in state
FULPLQDOFDVHV´ 
275. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 492. Again, it is generally accepted that the Takings Clause
was incorporated and made applicable to the states through Chicago B. & Q.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897).
276. See SUTTON, supra note 44, at 8±9; see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional
Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 345 (2004)
[hereinafter State Constitutional Law].
277. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002).
278. See State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 345.
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dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions
RIVWDWHODZ´279 In shoUW³>V@WDWHFRXUWVKDYHDXWKRULW\WRFRQVWUXHWKHLURZQ
constitutional provisions however they wish,´280 DQGVKRXOGORRNWR³WKHLURZQ
FRQVWLWXWLRQV WR GHWHUPLQH LQGLYLGXDO FLYLO OLEHUWLHV´ UDWKHU WKDQ EOLQGO\
New
proceeding in lockstep with Supreme Court jurisprudence.281
FHGHUDOLVP¶VSURSRQHQWVDUJXHWKDW³RQHRIWKHVWUHQJWKVRIRXUIHGHUDOV\VWHP
LVWKDWLWSURYLGHVDGRXEOHVRXUFHRISURWHFWLRQIRUWKHULJKWVRIRXUFLWL]HQV´282
They submit that New Federalism is logical considering that federal
constitutional guarantees of individual rights originated in the states. 283
Furthermore, new federalism provides state courts the opportunity to have the
final say on matters because decisions grounded solely on state constitutional
provisions are unreviewable by the Supreme Court.284
Though traditionally employing a lockstep approach to the interpretation of
WKH³VWDWHFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶V'HFODUDWLRQRI5LJKWV´DQGSDUDOOHOSURYLVLRQVLQWKH
Bill of Rights, the Wisconsin Supreme Court fully embraced New Federalism

279. Brennan, supra note 58, at 502; see also SUTTON, supra note 44, at 9. Proponents of New
FHGHUDOLVPLQVLVWWKDW³>V@WDWHFRXUWVQHHGQ¶WVKLIWZLWKFKDQJHVLQWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKH866XSUHPH
&RXUW´State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 347. Theoretically, New Federalism provides
valuable benefits to the constitutional system of dual federalism. The fact that (1) state courts may be
freer in developing new rules and doctrines and (2) the Supreme Court would benefit from the judicial
experimentation of various state courts when developing its own rules are just two of several reasons
to seriously consider this approach. See SUTTON, supra note 44, at 17±18, 20. Even so, the
³IXQGDPHQWDOSX]]OH´RINew Federalism is the determination of which questions are important for
XQLIRUPLW\ DV ³D PDWWHU RI uniform QDWLRQDO SROLF\´ DQG ZKLFK ³DOORZ IRU VWDWH GLIIHUHQFHV´ State
Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 348.
280. SUTTON, supra note 44, at 16; Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63
TEX. L. REV.     ³3URSRQHQWV RI VWDWH FRXUW DFWLYLVP KDYH DUJXHG YLJRURXVO\ WKDW LQ
interpreting their own constitutions, state courts legitimately may diverge from the authoritative
interpretations of analogous provisions in the federal constitution´ 
281. State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 345. Under New Federalism, the constitutional
GHFLVLRQVRIIHGHUDOFRXUWVDUHPHUHO\SHUVXDVLYHDQGVWDWHFRXUWMXGJHV³VHULRXVO\HUU´LIWKH\DGRSWD
lockstep approach without independently weighing the protections provided by their own state
constitution. Brennan, supra note 58, at 502. Thus, pursuant to New Federalism, state courts should
only follow federal court decisions to the extent they are logical and well-reasoned. Id.
282. Brennan, supra note 58, at 503 (noting that fHGHUDOFDVHV³WKDWIRUHFORVHIHGHUDOUHPHGLHV
FRQVWLWXWHVDFOHDUFDOOWRVWDWHFRXUWVWRVWHSLQWRWKHEUHDFK´).
283. See SUTTON, supra note 44, at 8.
284. See Michigan v. Long86   ³,IWKHVWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQLQGLFDWHV
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
JURXQGVZHRIFRXUVHZLOOQRWXQGHUWDNHWRUHYLHZWKHGHFLVLRQ´ 
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in the early 2000s.285 For example, in State v. Knapp,286 the court abandoned
:LVFRQVLQ¶V ORFNVWHS DSSURDFK WR )LIWK $PHQGPHQW FULPLQDO GXH SURFHVV
protections in favor of more expansive protections under the SWDWH¶V SDUDOOHO
constitutional provision.287 Similarly, in State v. Dubose,288 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court struck its own path²for the first time unmoored by parallel
Supreme Court jurisprudence²on the issue of eyewitness identification
evidence.289
TKHVH WZR RSLQLRQV DQG WKH FRXUW¶V HPEUDFH RI New Federalism were
VHYHUHO\ FULWLFL]HG WKURXJKRXW WKH :LVFRQVLQ OHJDO FRPPXQLW\ DV ³SXUH
unvarnished result-RULHQWDWLRQ´290 For one, United States Court of Appeals
Judge Diane Sykes²a former Justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court²
argued that the Wisconsin SuSUHPH &RXUW¶V IDLOXUH WR UHVW LWV independent
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DQDO\VLV RQ HLWKHU WKH ³ODQJXDJH RU KLVWRU\ RI WKH VWDWH
FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶V´SURYLVLRQVUHIOHFWHGDFRXUWSXUVXLQJLWV³RZQSROLF\MXGJPHQW´
rather than a principled analysis and interpretation of thHVWDWH¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
provision.291 Truly, though there are several concerns with the doctrine,292 the
greatest might be that New FHGHUDOLVP XQGHQLDEO\ ³LPEXHV WKH FRXUW ZLWK
VXEVWDQWLDODXWKRULW\´293 DQGVXEMHFWVVWDWHFRXUWVDQGFRQVWLWXWLRQV³WRWKHVDPH
YDJDULHVDVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHIHGHUDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ´294 Such an aggressive
285. Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 733
(2006). See also State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 348 (³:LVFRQVLQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKH
IHGHUDOV\VWHPFDQIRUWKHPRVWSDUWEHGHVFULEHGDVORFNVWHS´). This change was likely stimulated
by then-Chief JustiFH$EUDKDPVRQ¶VHPEUDFHRIWKHGRFWULQH. See generally, Abrahamson, supra note
274; State Constitutional Law, supra note 276.
286. 2005 WI 127, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.
287. See Rick Esenberg, A Court Unbound? The Recent Jurisprudence of the Wisconsin
Supreme
Court
9±10
(2007),
https://fedsoc-cmspublic.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/IhZ6cE38iAto3CRWgllVqKrbM9j2IkM6y7zNZE56.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RXG9-KHUW] [hereinafter Esenberg White Paper]; see also Sykes, supra note 285,
at 731±34.
288. 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.
289. See Sykes, supra note 285, at 734.
290. Id. at 733.
291. Id.
292. For example, in addition to the aforementioned concerns with judicial activism, New
Federalism also (1) restricts the flexibility of state government and (2) leads to unpredictable results.
See Maltz, supra note 280, at 1002.
293. Esenberg White Paper, supra note 287, at 10.
294. Richard A. Epstein, The Double-Edged Sword of State Constitutional Law, 9 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 723, 743 (2015) [hereinafter Double-Edged Sword]. Thus, just as Progressives on the
Supreme CourWVZHSWDZD\³DOOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOREVWDFOHVWRWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHLUSROLWLFDODQG
VRFLDODJHQGD´WKH\FRXOGDJDLQWDNHWKLVTXDVL-legislative position in state courts. Richard A. Epstein,
The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough?, 58 STAN. L.
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approach to judging should be avoided lest state courts²like the Wisconsin
Supreme Court following Knapp and Dubose²be justifiably labeled as
³DFWLYLVW´²a disturbing characterization for any court.295 While the Wisconsin
6XSUHPH &RXUW VKRXOG QRW VLPSO\ ³WRH WKH OLQH´ RI 6XSUHPH &RXUW DQDO\VLV
merely for the sake of uniformity,296 it should have some principled basis on
which to justify a departure from Supreme Court analysis of parallel
constitutional provisions.297
In the context of the Takings Clause, there appears to be no such basis for
a divergent approach under the Wisconsin Constitution. Takings Clause
provisions under the Wisconsin and federal constitutions are substantively
nearly identical.298 While, under New Federalism, similarities in both text and
structure do not necessarily require consistent interpretations,299 a differing
approach²even if to further bolster personal property rights²would

REV. 1793, 1795 (2006). Those who initially championed New Federalism were not so concerned
DERXWFRUUHFWGHFLVLRQVXQGHUWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQEXWUDWKHUEHOLHYHGWKDWVWDWHFRXUWV³PDQLIHVWSXUSRVH
is to expand constitutiRQDOSURWHFWLRQV´ZKHUHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWIDLOHGWRGRVRSee Brennan, supra
note 58, at 503. Thus, this approach, without considering history or context or history of the
constitutional provisions at issue, is merely results-orientation that is unbecoming of the role of the
judiciary. See Sykes, supra note 285, at 733; see also Michael B. Brennan, Are Courts Becoming too
Activist: Wisconsin’s Supreme Court has Shown a Worrisome Turn in That Direction, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 2, 2005, at J2 [hereinafter Michael B. Brennan].
295. See Michael B. Brennan, supra note 294; see also, Esenberg White Paper, supra note 287,
at 10; Sykes, supra note 285, at 737±38.
296. Indeed, courts that do take this approach must do so thoughtfully and with much care. See
Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1503±04, 1530±31 (2005).
297. Judge Sykes contrasted the dangerous and aggressive approach to judging presented by
New Federalism with the principled approach of judicial restraint:
[Under New Federalism,] longstanding legal standards are rewritten or simply
disregarded at will, either by reference to less authoritative decisional resources²
such as disputed social science research²or simply the cRXUW¶VRZQVXEMHFWLYH
policy judgment and raw power to render a binding statewide decision. Judges
who are sensitive to some limits on the scope of judicial authority and competence
generally try to confine themselves to authoritative and objective sources of
interpretation²WKH ODZ¶V ODQJXDJH VWUXFWXUH ORJLF DQG KLVWRU\²and are
VNHSWLFDORIEURDGDSSHDOVWRWKHFRXUW¶VSROLF\MXGJPHQW Among other things,
this approach has the virtue of constraining the judges to behave like judges rather
than legislators.
Sykes, supra note 285, at 737; see also Michael B. Brennan, supra note 294 (noting that the practice
of judicial restraint is the opposite of judicial activism).
298. Compare Amendment V in the U.S. Constitution ³>1@RUVKDOOSULYDWHSURSHUW\EHWDNHQIRU
SXEOLFXVHZLWKRXWMXVWFRPSHQVDWLRQ´ with article I, section 13 in the Wisconsin Constitution ³7KH
property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor´ 
299. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 500; see also SUTTON, supra note 44, at 16.
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undoubtedly open the court to damaging charges of judicial activism. 300 Thus,
absent some distinguishing language, context, or ascertainable intent,
Wisconsin courts should primarily look to the analysis of the Supreme Court
for guidance on the regulatory takings doctrine.
b. Narrow Interpretation and Application of Murr’s Multi-Factor Test
“[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.”
— Justice Joseph P. Bradley301
The second, more judicially conservative approach302²nonetheless
capable of protecting individual property rights²would be to follow but
narrowly construe Murr¶V PXOWL-fDFWRU WHVW LQ RUGHU WR SURWHFW ³DJDLQVW DQ\
VWHDOWK\HQFURDFKPHQWV´RQLQGLYLGXDOULJKWVJXDUDQWHHGE\WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ303
Although the majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to address the
denominator question in its first Takings Clause decision following Murr²
Adams Outdoor Advertising v. Madison304²it will almost certainly soon have
300. :KLOHWKLVFDQQRWEHFRQILUPHG³XQless and until we know how state courts will exercise
their new IRXQG FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SRZHUV´ LW LV QRW ZRUWK WKH SRWHQWLDO GDPDJH WR WKH LQWHJULW\ RI WKH
institution. Double-Edged Sword, supra note 294, at 725. Also, New Federalism appears to serve as a
³GRXEOH-HGJHG VZRUG´ WR EH ZLHOGHG E\ DGYRFDWHV RI ERWK OLPLWHG federal government and big
government. Id. at 743; see also State Constitutional Law, supra note 276, at 348±49 (The tide seems
to turn based on the rights at stake); Michael B. Brennan, supra note 294 (³$QDFWLYLVWFRXUWLQRQH
direction can turn activist in the opposite way. Unmoored from its constitutionally defined role, the
court floats with the political tide. . . . [E]veryone is against judicial activism, but only as he or she
GHILQHVLW´ Id. Criticism of judicial activism can just as easily be leveled by either side where a court
steps outside the bounds of its role.
301. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
302. Judicially conservative not in the political sense, but only in the sense that such an approach
adheres to the traditional bounds of judicial restraint rather than judicial activism. See Brennan, supra
note 294.
303. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
304. 2018 WI 70 (2018). At issue in Adams Outdoor Advert. L.P. v. City of Madison was
ZKHWKHU$GDPV¶s property was taken when the City of Madison constructed a pedestrian bridge that
blocked visibility from the highway of one site of the billboard. Id. ¶ 2. The majority held that ³a right
to visibility of private property from a public road is not a cognizable right giving rise to a protected
SURSHUW\ LQWHUHVW´ Id. ¶ 5. Summarily GLVPLVVLQJ WKH ³ULJKW WR YLVLELOLW\´ DV QRW FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
protected, the majority failed to even cite Murr in its discussion of the relevant parcel. Id. ¶ 44. But
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another chance to do so. Indeed, the Adams Outdoor PDMRULW\¶VIDLOXUHWRHYHQ
cite Murr leaves a blank slate on which the court can yet develop its iteration
of the Murr test. Moving forward, there are two dangerous pitfalls that
Wisconsin courts must avoid as they sort out this issue.
First, Wisconsin courts must not give too much weight to Murr¶V ILUVW
factor²the treatment of the land under state and local law. The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals in Murr v. State IRFXVHGRQWKH³NH\´RIWKHWUHDWPHQWRIWKH
land under state law, noting that the contiguousness of the lots and their merger
under state law was a near-determinative factor that led to their aggregation for
purposes of the takings analysis.305 But the analysis under Murr is much more
KROLVWLFLQQDWXUH:KLOHFRXUWVPXVWJLYH³VXEVWDQWLDOZHLJKW´WRWKHWUHDWPHQW
of the land under state law, there is no single factor that should dominate the
analysis.306 Rather than continuing to rely so heavily on the treatment of the
land under state law, Wisconsin courts should carefully weigh this
consideration together with the other two factors under the new analysis.
Furthermore, the scope of the analysis under this first factor should be
QDUURZO\ FRQVWUXHG ZKHQ GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH ³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´ RI :LVFRQVLQ
property owners¶ expectations. Measuring these expectations based on laws or
regulations on comparable property in other regions or states would place too
high a burden on homeowners as they develop their own expectations.307 This
over-inclusive approach would further tilt the playing field against property
owners, nearly guaranteeing that some analogous regulation can be found for
each regulatory overreach at issue in a takings claim.308 Rather, when
the dissent took a different view of the property right at issue, noting that the precise property right at
issue was the permit for the single side of the billboard no longer visible from the road rather than a
³ULJKWWRYLVLELOLW\´Id. ¶ 47 (Bradley, Rebecca J., dissenting). The dissent came to this conclusion
GHVSLWHWKHPDMRULW\¶VHUURQHRXVEHOLHIWKDWWKHSODLQWLIIVKDGIRUIHLWHGWKLVDUJXPHQWSee id. ¶ 24 n.8.
Recognizing the importance of the denominator factor, id. ¶ 55, the dissent proceeded to conduct
a thorough analysis of Murr¶VPXOWL-factor analysis to identify the precise parcel at issue, id. ¶¶ 59±66.
The dissent carefully analyzed each Murr factor DQG GHWHUPLQHG WKDW HDFK ³PLOLWDWH>G@ LQ IDYRU RI
GHVLJQDWLQJ´WKHSHUPLWIRUDVLQJOHVLGHRIthe billboard as the relevant parcel for the purposes of the
analysis. Id. The dissent then completed the Takings Clause analysis by concluding that the bridge
FRPSOHWHO\GHSULYHGWKHSHUPLWRILWV³RQO\HFRQRPLFDOO\YLDEOHXVH´id. ¶ 74, and therefore constituted
in an unconstitutional taking for which the plaintiffs were due just compensation. Id. ¶ 75.
Thus, although the disagreement in Adams focused on the issue for forfeiture, id. ¶ 24 n.8, ¶ 75 n.6
(Bradley, Rebecca J., dissenting), the dissent laid a solid analytical foundation for future Takings
Clause analyses at the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
305. Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, ¶¶ 19±20 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2014) (per curiam) (unpublished).
306. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
307. See Brady, supra note 79, at 66±68.
308. Id.
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considering the reasonableness of the property RZQHU¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV
Wisconsin courts should consider only laws that currently exist within the State
or the relevant region. This limited approach will ensure that property owners
will have²or at least, are more likely to have²sufficient notice when
developing their reasonable investment-backed expectations.
The second pitfall Wisconsin courts must navigate is the final Murr factor:
bDODQFLQJ RI WKH ³HFRQRPLF V\QHUJLHV´ SXW LQWR SOD\ ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ WKH
³HIIHFWRIWKHEXUGHQHGODQGRQWKHYDOXHRIRWKHUKROGLQJV´309 This particularly
malleable factor may be easily manipulated by individual parties seeking to
persuasively frame the property at issue. For example, regulators may cast this
IDFWRU DV D ³IDU-UHDFKLQJ GHIHQVH´ DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH SUHVHQFH RI some valuebased complementarianism is sufficient for the court to consider the property
RZQHU¶VSURSHUWLHVDVDZKROH310 This approach could open the balancing test
to governmental abuse and lead to the neglect of the other factors where the
court detects any ³VSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLS´RUYDOXH-based complementarianism is
found.311
8QIRUWXQDWHO\WKLVDUJXPHQWFRXOGILQGDILUPIRXQGDWLRQLQ:LVFRQVLQ¶V
regulatory takings law. Specifically, two Wisconsin cases²Just v. Marinette
County312 and Piper v. Ekern313²strengthen this argument in the context of
environmental regulations. In Just, the court held that private property owners
KDYHDEVROXWHO\QRULJKW³WRFKDQJHWKHHVVHQWLDOQDWXUDOFKDUDFWHURIKLVODQG´
ZKHUHWKRVHFKDQJHV³LQMXUH>@WKHULJKWVRIRWKHUV´314 Additionally, in Piper,
the court held:
[W]hile . . . a material diminution in value may result,
nevertheless a reciprocal advantage accrues which in many
instances it is impossible to estimate from a financial
standpoint, but which nevertheless constitutes a thing of value
and a compensating factor for the interference by the public

309. Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 254, 256 (quoting Murr, 137 S. Ct.
at 1946).
310. Id. at 254.
311. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946, 1949.
312. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
313. 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923).
314. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17. The court reasoned that the takings analysis undergoes a shift where
WKHRZQHU¶VDFWLRQVGR³GDPDJHWRWKHULJKWVRIWKHSXEOLF´³[w]hile loss of value is to be considered
in determining whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing the character
of the land at the expense of harm tRSXEOLFULJKWVLVQRWDQHVVHQWLDOIDFWRURUFRQWUROOLQJ´Id. at 22±
23.
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with property rights.315
7KHUHIRUHXQGHU:LVFRQVLQ¶VFXUUHQWUHJXODWRU\WDNLQJVODZ  SURSHUW\
owners have no right to make unnatural alterations to their property,316 (2)
SHUFHLYHG³UHFLSURFDODGYDQWDJH>V@´VHUYHDVD³FRPSHQVDWLQJIDFWRU´317 and
(3) as previously discussed, property owners are only due just compensation
ZKHUH³DOORUVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOOSUDFWLFDOXVHVRIWKHSURSHUW\´DUHGHQLHG318
Applying these principles in a situation similar to Murr, the government
could argue that the mere aesthetic enhancement of leaving a merged parcel
undeveloped²otherwise rendered useless to the owner²is enough of a
³UHFLSURFLW\RIEHQHILWV´WRMXVWLI\WKHUHJXODWLRQ. So long as the properties have
some value-VDYLQJ ³VSHFLDO UHODWLRQVKLS´ WKDW UHFLSURFDO UHODWLRQVKLS FRXOG
arguably be construed as complimentary under the third Murr factor.319 Under
this formulation, it would be hard to see any regulation rising to the level of a
taking.
On the other end of the spectrum, property owners may seek to manipulate
the third Murr factor by arguing that economic complementarianism is
necessary for the other holdings to be considered part of the parcel as a
whole.320 This second approach, likely focusing RQ -XVWLFH .HQQHG\¶V
VWDWHPHQWWKDW³WKHDEVHQFHRIDVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLS . . may counsel against
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIDOOWKHKROGLQJVDVDVLQJOHSDUFHO´321 will seek to make the
lack of a value-based complementarianism outcome determinative rather than
simply a part of the more comprehensive analysis suggested by the Court.322

315. Piper, 180 Wis. at 591. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even purely aesthetic
considerations were a sufficient justification for the exercise of zoning powers because the limitations
were mutually beneficial. See State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,
270, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955); see also Wisconsin Takings Historical Perspective, supra note 134,
at 9.
316. Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17.
317. Piper, 180 Wis. at 591.
318. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531 (1996); see also
Zealy discussion supra Section IV.A.
319. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946, 1949 (2017). Indeed, in Murr, the Court gave
H[DPSOHVRIZKDWW\SHVRIYDOXHDGGLQJ³HIIHFW´FRXUWVVKRXOGFRQVLGHUId. at 1946. These examples,
unfortunately, only confirm the risk presented in this hypothetical, focusing on intangible benefits
³VXFK DV . . . increasing privacy, expanding recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural
EHDXW\´Id. These benefits²subjective in nature and easily manipulatable²place the protection of
private property rights wholly in the hands of the court.
320. Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 262.
321. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
322. Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, supra note 117, at 254, 260±62.
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$GRSWLRQRIHLWKHUH[WUHPHZRXOGFLUFXPYHQWWKH&RXUW¶VLQWHQWLRQWKDWWKH
parcel as a whole be determined by a variety of factors. Therefore, when
considering the third Murr factor, Wisconsin courts should look for some direct
impact or interplay between the parcels at issue. The adoption of this narrower
approach would force the government to prove more than a tenuous relationship
between the parties, thus protecting individual property owners²as much as is
possible under Murr¶V test²against capricious aggregation determinations by
the courts.323 Property owners could then better predict and formulate
reasonable investment-backed expectations, ensuring that the scales in the
regulatory takings analysis are not insurmountably stacked against them. This
approach would also protect against manipulation at the hands of landowners.
:KLOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQMurr certainly does not bode well
for individual property owners, state courts such as those in Wisconsin can
minimize Murr¶V LPSDFW WKURXJK D QDUURZ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI LWV PXOWL-factor
denominator analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The story of Murr is one of perseverance. The Murrs, just a regular family
with a recreational cabin in northern Wisconsin, were told they could not sell
their vacant lot to fund necessary renovations to their property.324 The Murrs
fought these regulations all the way to the Supreme Court only to lose²
witnessing the further decimation of personal property protections at their
expense.325 Nevertheless, this was not the end of their story. State legislators
responded to the Murr GHFLVLRQE\SDVVLQJWKH:LVFRQVLQ+RPHRZQHUV¶Bill of
Rights,326 giving the Murrs the right²after a more than fifteen-year legal
fight²to dispose of their property as they see fit.327
The legal lesson from Murr is that states are in a unique position of
influence when it comes to the protection of personal property rights. Although
the regulatory takings doctrine has largely developed at the federal level,
personal property rights²the rights at stake in a regulatory takings analysis²
323. As previously noted in this section, giving too much weight to the existence of any valuebased complementarianism would invariably lead to the aggregation of parcels that exhibit even the
most attenuated relationship²economic or otherwise.
324. See Groen, supra note 2.
325. Id.
326. See Bruce Vielmetti, Wisconsin Cabin Owners Who Lost at U.S. Supreme Court Win in the
Wisconsin
Legislature,
MILWAUKEE
J.
SENTINEL
ONLINE
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/07/wisconsin-cabin-owners-who-lost-u-ssupreme-court-wins-wisconsin-legislature/841939001/ [https://perma.cc/L7Q2-ANTN].
327. Id.
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have traditionally been defined pursuant to state law.328 Thus, as WisconsLQ¶V
was here, state legislatures should be proactive about engaging the continuing
deterioration of constitutional property rights. Furthermore, state courts should
narrowly construe the Murr¶V WHVW  ³:KHWKHU WKURXJK WKH FRXUWV RU WKH
OHJLVODWXUH VHFXULQJ LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV LQ SURSHUW\ LV IXQGDPHQWDO WR OLEHUW\´
state legislatures and courts must not ignore this responsibility.329
:KLOH:LVFRQVLQ¶V+RPHRZQHUV¶ Bill of Rights has provided a template
both for other states and for continued property rights protection within the
State, Wisconsin courts have yet to establish their analysis of the denominator
issue following Murr. As discussed, Wisconsin courts should not take an
activist approach and develop an independent Takings Clause analysis pursuant
to the Wisconsin Constitution absent some principled basis for that deviation.
Rather, they should faithfully yet QDUURZO\FRQVWUXH-XVWLFH.HQQHG\¶VWHVWLQ
Murr to ensure that the government does not become insulated from takings
claims. By adopting this approach, Wisconsin courts can do their part to
preserve WKHIUHHGRPRISURSHUW\RZQHUV³WRVKDSHDQGWRSODQWKHLURZQGHVWLQ\
LQDZRUOGZKHUHJRYHUQPHQWVDUHDOZD\VHDJHUWRGRVRIRUWKHP´330
DAVID J. WENTHOLD*

328. See discussion supra note 239.
329. Burnett, supra note 3.
330. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
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